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WHERE THE MONEY IS: REMEDIES TO
FINANCE COMPLIANCE WITH STRICT
STRUCTURAL INJUNCTIONS
James M. Hirschhorn*

Since the early 1970's, the federal district courts have been enforcing the constitutional and statutory rights of those dependent on
state and local government institutions by injunctions requiring improvements in the services provided. The process frequently has involved substantial increases in government spending on staff and
facilities, 1 and the governments involved were at times reluctant or
unable to provide the necessary funds. 2 While the courts have consistently taken the position that lack of funds does not relieve the
defendants of their duty to protect constitutional rights, 3 they have
also tended to avoid confrontation over finances by negotiation or by
arranging for federal subsidies.4 Since 1980, however, there have
been several instances of outright refusal by the political authorities
to appropriate the money needed to comply with structural decrees. 5
Executive branch defendants have attempted either to defend
against contempt proceedings6 or to obtain a modification of the decree7 on the ground that the failure of independent nonparties, i.e.,
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Newark. A.B. 1969, Johns Hopkins
University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. See notes 4-53 infra and accompanying text.
2. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURT AND SOCIAL POLICY 258-59 (1977); Weinstein, The Effect ofAusterity on Institutional Litigation, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 145 (1982); Note, Implementation Problems in lnslilulional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 453 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Implementation Problems]; Note, Federal Courts and Stale Prison
Reform: A Formula for Large Scale Federal Intervention Into Stales Affairs, 14 SUFFOLK U. L.
Rev. 545, 575-76 (1980); Developments in the Law- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
Rev. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments - 1977]. See generally Gelfland, The
Burger Court and the New Federalism, 21 B.C. L. REV. 763, 825-29 (1980).
3. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468, 469-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), affd., 712 F.2d
809 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1907 (1984); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 146-47.
5. E.g., Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817 (D.
Mass. 1982); Delaware Yalley Citizens Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.),
affd., 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd., 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 492 F.
Supp. lllO (E.D.N.Y.), revd., 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. E.g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1110
(E.D.N.Y.), revd., 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
1. E.g., Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); cf. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558
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the legislature, to provide funds made it impossible to comply. Since
actual impossibility is a recognized defense to contempt, 8 the lower
courts have had to consider whether the asserted lack of money excused failure to obey the decree and, if not, how the court could
obtain the resources needed for compliance.
This Article examines the formal powers that are available to the
federal courts9 to meet this situation. Part I places the problem in
perspective, describing the party structure of the institutional reform
decree, the :financial burdens it places on the government defendants,
and the relationship of these defendants to the fiscal authorities.
Part II surveys the coercive powers historically available to the federal courts sitting in equity. Part III discusses the use of these devices against government defendants who claim financial
impossibility. It emphasizes the limited recognition of impossibility,
the power to compel the defendants to use available resources efficiently and the indirect coercion of the fiscal authorities by direct
pressure on the defendant. Part IV deals with direct proceedings
against the treasury or the appropriating body with emphasis on the
possible constraints on such proceedings arising from eleventh
amendment immunity. It suggests that, where permitted by the eleventh amendment, direct proceedings may better protect both the
public's interest in continued services and political control of ultimate trucing and spending decisions than indirect pressure through
such actions as closing the institution.
It should be noted that this Article is intended not as a plan of
campaign but only a tour of the judicial arsenal. The judge who
F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1977) (upholding a decree ordering the state to restore funds taken from
mental patients under a statutory scheme designed to cover the costs of care in state
institutions).
8. See notes 75-82 infra and accompanying text.
9. It is true that the current behavior of the Supreme Court has occasioned a call for more
creative interpretation and aggressive protection of fundamental rights derived from state constitutions by state courts. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Some state courts have responded. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 NJ. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); cf. Perez v. Boston Housing
Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980) (city housing authority placed under receivership to vindicate tenants' rights under state law). See generally .Developments in the Law- The
Interpretation ofState Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1356-67 (1982) (hereinafter cited as .Developments- 1982]. Nevertheless, compared to federal courts, the power of the
state courts to give sustained support to expensive, unpopular, counter-majoritarian claims is
limited, both by the more politically responsive selection and tenure of most state judges and
by the greater ease with which state constitutions may be amended. See .Developments- 1982,
supra, at 1351-54. Moreover, the Supreme Court's most recent decision in Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), apparently prevents the lower federal
courts from basing structural relief on state law. This Article therefore assumes that the federal
courts enforcing federal law will remain the primary engines of major institutional reform
litigation.
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oversees a structural litigation is involved in a continuing process of
inducement and adjustment with the political authorities behind the
official defendants. His or her primary goal is to maximize compliance and if accommodation works better than coercion, then accommodation is to be preferred. 10 As a part of the process, the judge
needs a realistic sense of the total funds available to the political
authorities for all purposes and the tradeoffs the decree forces them
to make. 11 Nevertheless, the judge is not merely a negotiator. His or
her ability to persuade depends in large part on the ultimate power
to command. This Article concerns itself with that power.

I. THE

STRUCTURAL DECREE AND THE PUBLIC

F1sc

The phenomenon of the structural injunction has been copiously
described over the past ten years, 12 and there is no need to repeat the
process in detail here. For the purposes of this Article it is enough to
say that a structural decree is one that responds to the systematic
denial of the rights of the plaintiff class as a necessary consequence
of the formal organization or the actual pattern of activity in a governmental institution. The earliest example of structural relief, discussed by Professor Fiss, was in response to the de jure dual school_
system and the patterns of pupil and staff assignment that survived
its formal abolition.13 Another early application of structural relief
was to correct the comprehensive denial of eighth amendment rights
in the Arkansas prison system which arose from a combination of
brutal discipline, insufficient food and medical care, placing some
prisoners in authority over others and a lack of physical safety from
violent prisoners. 14 The characteristic relief sought in such cases is
10. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1293-94 (1976); Fiss, The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 50-56 (1979); Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 445-56.
11. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 145-48.
12. See generally, 0. FISS, THE CML RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); D. HOROWITZ, supra
note 2; Chayes, supra note 10, at 1281; Fiss, supra note 10; Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Special Project, Remedial Process]; Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 428; Note,
Civil Rights Suits Again.rt State and Local Government Entities and Officials: Rights ofAction,
Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945 (1980); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation ofa Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975) (hereinafter
cited as Note, The Wyatt Case].
13. 0. Fiss, supra note 12, at 4-6; Fiss, supra note 10, at 2-4.
14. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 680-88 (1978), for a history of the litigation, which
began in 1969. See generally Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt//), qffd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Hutto,
363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (Holt III), revd sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1979); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976),
qffd, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), qffd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). The litigation actually began in
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to reorganize the defendant institution so that it will routinely deal
with the plaintiff class in a way that does not deprive them of the
rights at issue. 15
Typically, the government agency is providing some type of service16 to a class of dependent plaintiffs. The most extreme type of
dependence occurs in custodial institutions - prisons, mental hospitals, "schools" for the mentally handicapped - in which the plaintiffs are either legally confined or incompetent and the institution
furnishes their entire surroundings. 17 In a less extreme but still substantial instance of dependence, a client class receives an essential or
extremely desirable service - education, housing, subsistence allowances - from the agency. 18 In other cases, the plaintiff class depends on government regulatory activity to secure its private
interests. 19 The rights involved may be either statutory claims to a
given level of service20 or the conditional claim to have the relationship with an agency exist, if at all, without denial of constitutional
rights. 21 The dependence of the plaintiff class insures that its members' claim on the agency has been and will be a continuing one. 22
two earlier cases: Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated, 404 F.2d 571
(8th Cir. 1968); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). Conditions in the
Arkansas system at the beginning of the litigation could be fairly described as like those in the
Soviet Gulag, only warmer. Compare Hutto v. Finney, 431 U.S. at 681-83, nn.3-7, with A.
SOLZHENITSYN, ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH,passim (1962).
15. See Chayes, supra note IO, at 1298-302; Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note
12, at 809-15.
16. It seems peculiar to call detention a "service," but the keeper, as such, is comprehensively responsible for the inmates' shelter, diet, health care, and physical safety. See, e.g.,
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Stickney v.
List, 519 F. Supp. 617, 619-20 (D. Nev. 1981); New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 89394 (N.D. Miss. 1972), '!lfd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) (essays on the social situations of mental patients and other inmates).
17. Gates v. Collier, SOI F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
& Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), '!lfd in part and revd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), revd, 451 U.S. I (1981); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), '!lfd in
part and revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. See, e.g., Fortin v. Commr. of Mass. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790 (Isl Cir. 1982)
(general assistance benefits) [hereinafter cited as Fortin v. Co=r.J; White v. Mathews, 559
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977) (disability benefits), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Perez v. Boston
Housing Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980) (public housing).
19. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.
Pa.) (enforcement of air pollution control), '!lfd., 618 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
969 (1982).
20. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), revd, 104
S. Ct. 900 (1984).
21. See notes 285-89 infra and accompanying text.
22. See Piss, supra note 10, at 19-20; Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at
870-77.
The Supreme Court appears to consider the continuing dependent relationship of a definable class as an essential prerequisite to this type of relief. One of the principal obstacles to
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The reasons why a government institution systematically denies
the claims of a dependent class are complex,23 but for the purpose of
this Article it is only necessary to mention one: the lack of political
will to provide enough resources - i.e., money-to permit the institution to function properly. In the case of prisoners, the dependent
class is the object of positive ill-will by the political authorities and
the public at large.24 More usually, it consists of groups of persons
such as the mentally ill, the retarded, the poor and, of course, nonwhites, who are the object of dislike or indifference. This dislike,
together with some degree of exclusion from the political process,
prevents them from competing politically with other demands on the
public purse, including lowering taxes. Such resources as are made
available to the agency may be diverted by its management to claims
which it considers superior to those of the intended benefi.ciaries.25
One of the objects of a plaintiff class in litigation requesting structural relief is therefore to force the defendants to provide enough
money in the form of trained staff, physical facilities, or otherwise, to
meet plaintiffs' claims on the institution for service.26
The selection of defendants in actions for structural injunctive
using the structural injunction to control police behavior in the field has.been the Court's
unwillingness to find either standing or an imminent threat of irreparable injury where police
misconduct is inflicted more or less at random, without racial, political, or other forbidden
class animus. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1667-70 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 371-77 (1976); see also Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(interpreting Rizzo to say that a federal court should refrain from assuming a comprehensive
supervisory role over broad areas of local government for the purpose of preventing speculative future misconduct by local officials toward an imprecise class of potential victims); cf.
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 812 (1974) (injunctive relief held appropriate where a persistent pattern of police misconduct was directed at a discrete group).
23. The complexities of conflicting interests within institutions, the absence of positive
lines of authority, the making of decisions by interest acco=odation and their effect on structural relief are well described in Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 431-35. The
opinion of Judge Justice in Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1386-89 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), and619 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1438 (1983) perceptively illustrates the problem that those in nominal control of a complex
organization have in getting their orders carried out, even when they have the best of
intentions.
24. The extreme case is the idea that a prison system should be self-supporting, or even
profitable. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1376 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modtfted, 650
F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), and619 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983);
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 828-30 (E.D. Ark. 1969). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 353-60 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. In Perez v. Boston Housing Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 711-12, 722-24, 400 N.E.2d 1231,
1237-38, 1243-44 (1980), the agency's failure was caused in large part by management's insistence on hiring, contracting, and adjusting tenant grievances by the traditional methods of
Boston patronage politics.
26. See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and
Procedural Proposals, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 68 (1974); Note, The Wyatt Case, supra note 12, at
1347; cf. Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 819-21 (D. Mass. 1982); D. HOROWITZ, supra note 2,
at 257-59.
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relief is limited by the eleventh amendment immunity27 of state governments from suit in the federal courts and the legal fiction used to
evade it. As the Supreme Court has applied the eleventh amendment, a state may not be sued in its own name in the federal courts
without its consent.28 Suit brought in form against a state agency or
officer will be regarded as one against the state itself if the effect of a
judgment will be to require payment of damages or monetary restitution, such as back pay or a refund, from the state treasury. 29 Since
the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young, 30 however, it has
been p9ssible to enjoin violations of federal law by state officers
without interference by the eleventh amendment through the thinlyveiled fiction that a state officer who acts in violation of federal law
is not acting on behalf of the state but is merely a private individual
who has gone beyond the scope of his office. Transparent though this
device may be, it permits the federal courts to compel state officers to
conform their official conduct to federal law. 31 As a result, a suit for
structural injunctive relief against a state agency will be cast as a suit
against the executive officers who control it, in their official capacity,
rather than as a suit against the state, and the decree will run
accordingly.32
While the substance of structural decrees varies with the rights
involved and the facts of the case, they tend to share certain common
features. The decree, or rather the series of decrees, will begin by
prohibiting specific actions or conditions in violation of plaintiff's
rights and setting out a standard of proper performance of the defendant agency's functions. Both from deference to state or local
government responsibilities33 and from practical considerations, the
27. "Eleventh amendment immunity'' is used as a shorthand for the entire judicially developed doctrine of immunity of the state from suit in the federal courts, whether by its own
citizens or other persons. See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity .Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV.,
515, 516-18 (1978).
28. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
29. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,337 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663
(1974).
30. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
31. See notes 209-17 in.fro and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). When a state agency is sued in its own name for injunctive relief, the suit is treated as
if it were against the agency head, his or her subordinates, and their successors in office. E.g.,
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), mod!fted,
612F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), revd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), mod!fted, 673 F.2d 647 (3d
Cir. 1982), revd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). See also FED. R. C1v. P. 25(d)(2); C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 77, at 522 (4th ed. 1983).
33. Since the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1954), the Supreme
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initial decree may leave the defendants wide discretion to select the
specific methods for meeting their substantive obligations. As defendants fail to comply because of recalcitrance, incompetence, or a
combination of the two, the court will increasingly direct the detail
of their performance through subsequent orders. These modifications of the original decree frequently come in the guise of civil contempt sanctions for noncompliance with prior orders.34
Enforcing structural relief often requires the court to appoint a
variety of ancillary persons to assist it. These fall into three groups.
The first, masters, are quasi-judicial officials to whom the court delegates the formulation of further orders, the detailed supervision of
compliance, or the preliminary determination of factual matters involving members of the plaintiff class.35 The second group, generally known as "monitors," who scrutinize defendant's actions with
continuity, skill, and zeal beyond the ability of the diffuse and often
helpless members ·of the plaintiff class, essentially supplement that
class.36 The third group, receivers and quasi-receivers,37 are appointed in cases of severe, continuing noncompliance. They displace
the defendant officials and exercise some or all of their powers to
administer the institution in compliance with the decree. 38 Official
defendants can be expected to resist the appointment and activity of
any of these ancillary persons since these persons reduce their own
freedom of action.39
Court has continued to emphasize the need to rely on the integrity, good faith, technical skill
and knowledge of local officials, insofar as possible, in order to develop methods of implementing the requirements of substantive law. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81
(1977). See generally Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 864-65.
34. See 0. F1ss, supra note 12, at 36; Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 449;
Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 817-21.
35. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1326-28
(E.D. Pa. 1978), mod!fted, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), revd, 451 U.S. I (1981), mod!fted, 673
F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), revd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216,227
(D. Mass.), qffd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). See generally
Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 451-52; Special Project, Remedial Process,
supra note 12, at 827-28. To the extent that they may take binding action, rather than report to
the court, this category should include those officials who approve the application of relief to
individual class members, which the latter article calls "administrators." Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 831-35. An example is the "Special Master'' established in the
Pennhurst decree to review and approve an individuated treatment plan for each child. See
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
36. See Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 440-45; Special Project, Remedial
Process, supra note 12, at 828-30.
37. The term "quasi-receiver'' refers to an official inserted into the institution's management structure with power to coordinate compliance with the decree. See, e.g., Reed v.
Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 605-06, 617-18 (N.D. Ohio 1978), qffd, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979).
38. E.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977).
39. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 632-33 (3d Cir.

1822

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1815

The decree directs future actions, not specific expenditures as
such.40 These actions, nevertheless, impose three types of fiscal burdens on the defendant agency. The first are corrective expenditures
that seek to ameliorate the abuse and neglect caused by past funding.
The effect of orders to provide adequate numbers of properly trained
staff, improve food and sanitation, or upgrade the facility physically
is no more than to put the institution in the position of adequately
performing its existing mission. 41 Such orders are frequently welcomed by the executive defendants, who can use them to extract
more money from the political authorities to carry out what defendants already regard as their proper functions. 42
Many structural decrees also create a need for transforming expenditures - expenditures to undertake new functions required by
the substantive rights declared in the decree. One very common type
of transforming expenditure is pupil transportation cost in school desegregation cases.43 Other examples are the proposed creation of
work and rehabilitation programs in prisons44 and the shift from institutionalization to community-based care of the mentally ill or
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 289-90 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, revd in part by companion case Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781 (1978); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
see Note, The Wyatt Carf'., supra note 12, at 1360-69.
40. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
667-68 (1974).
41. An example is Judge Judd's opinion in New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Confronted with the squalid conditions at
Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded, he entered a preliminary injunction
requiring that conditions of custody be brought up to a permanent injunction that would implement a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment.
42. See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 26, at 60-61; Note, Implementation Problems,
supra note 2, at 454; Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 904-05; Note, The
Wyatt Carf'., supra note 12, at 1367-68.
State legislatures may suspect that this is what is happening, particularly if a consent decree
was involved or a political change of administration has taken place. After some unhappy
experiences with what turned out to be improvident consent decrees, see Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969
(1982); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d ISO (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977), the
Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a statute prohibiting any state officer from entering into a
consent decree without the express approval of the Governor and advance notice to the Legislature. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-204(e) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
In Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 820-21 (D. Mass. 1982), the district court denied at some
length the apparent insinuation of the state's counsel that the decree had been collusively entered into by the prior administration.
43. E.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 602-04, 615-17 (N.D. Ohio 1978), qjfd, 607
F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 263-64 (D. Mass.), qjfd, 530
F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
44. E.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), q/fd and mod!fted sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) (work and education programs in prison),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, revd in part by companion care Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781
(1978).
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handicapped.45 Unlike corrective measures, transforming expenditures support actions more likely to have been opposed by defendants, the political authorities and segments of the public on
substantive grounds, including aversion to the plaintiff class.46 They
are apt to be resisted accordingly.
Finally, structural decrees may impose on the defendant the expenses of supporting ancillary persons appointed by the court. Expenses of masters, monitors and receivers are generally imposed on
the defendant.47 Such expenses may be resisted for a variety of reasons: the presence of the ancillary person is offensive to the defendants' self-esteem, the expenditures amount to subsidizing the
adversary, or the costs are merely too great a burden.48
Thus, the structural decree, while not requiring the payment of
specific amounts, imposes a variety of :financial burdens which may
give rise to obstruction both by recalcitrant defendants and by the
legislative authorities on whom defendants depend for funding. The
practical effect of the decree may be to require the defendants to
spend a larger amount than they would wish in a manner they oppose. The decree gives a claim of priority to expenditures made to
achieve compliance - insofar as the decree is enforceable - first
within the budget of the defendant organization and, beyond that,
on behalf of the defendant against the total revenues available to the
taxing and appropriating legislature.49
45. E.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.), revd, 451 U.S. 1 (1979), modified, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982),
revd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
46. See, e.g., People of New York ex rel Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1982) (neighboring property owners obstructing group home for the mentally handicapped),
modified, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983); New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey,
456 F. Supp. 85, 94-95 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) (employees of institution for the mentally handicapped object to transfer of functions to private nonprofit organization).
At the remedial phase of the Pennhurst litigation the parents split into two groups: one
favoring deinstitutionalization and one, aligned with the state defendants, wanting upgraded
custodial care in the institution. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d
131 (3d Cir. 1979).
47. See, e.g., Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of.Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1981), qffd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984).
48. The first motive was present in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F.
Supp. 631, 634-35 (E.D. Pa. 1981), qffd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1315 (1984). The second was involved in the cutoff of appropriations to the monitor in the
Willowbrook litigation. See New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 492 F.
Supp. 1110, 1112-13 (E.D.N.Y.), revd, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980); N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1980,
§ 2, at 8, col. 1. For the third, see Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir.
1979).
49. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468, 478-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), qffd, 712 F.2d 809
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1907 (1984); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 827-28 (D.
Mass. 1982).
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As discussed in more detail below, a defendant is not subject to
civil contempt penalties for failure to comply with an injunction
when compliance is not possible. so Official defendants unwilling to
comply with a structural decree are therefore apt to assert that lack
of available funds excuses their nonperformance. In addition, legislatures opposed to the decree may attempt to make compliance impossible, either by holding down the general level of funds
appropriated to the defendant or by placing specific limits on the use
to which appropriated funds can be put.51 When plaintiffs respond
to the subsequent failure to comply with the decree by bringing civil
contempt proceedings,52 the court must first determine the validity of
· defendants' claim that it is financially out of their power to comply.
If this claim is valid, the court must determine how it can get the
necessary resources made available. It must do so, moreover, within
the constraints imposed by Ex parte Young on the choice of
defendants.53
II. TRADITIONAL COERCIVE DEVICES USED IN STRUCTURAL
LITIGATION

An examination of how the courts can deal with financially based
noncompliance must begin with a survey of the traditional powers of
an equity court to compel obedience to its orders and to direct the
management of property under its control. In its second Brown v.
Board ofEducation opinion,54 the Supreme Court stated that "equity
has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its reme~
dies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs."55 This often-reiterated56 invocation of the chancery tradiSO. See text at notes 75-82 infra.
51. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 473-74 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673
F.2d 628, 632-34 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); Note, Implementation
Problems, supra note 2, at 453 nn.141-42.
52. Alternatively, executive branch defendants may move to modify the decree in the light
of the supposed impossibility of compliance. See, e.g., Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d
150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
53. See notes 204-19 infra and accompanying text.
54. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
56. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192,200 (1973); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of
Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); Incarcerated
Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1974); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1974), a.ffd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
284 (1976); United States v. City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. 913, 917 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a.ffd in
part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). C.f. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 76-78 (1976); 0. F1ss, supra note 12, at 4-6.
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tion has blessed the increasing elaboration of structural remedies in
the ensuing thirty years. In addition to the general equity tradition
of common sense coupled to firmness of will, 57 t.he federal courts
handling institutional reform cases have been able to draw from a
well-filled store of specific remedial techniques developed by the
chancery courts in complex property litigation. Supposedly radical
departures from judicial self-restraint through such devices as receivers, monitors and anti-obstruction orders against third parties all
have their counterparts in the equity receiverships and corporate reorganizations of the late nineteenth century.58 Except where con57. Justice Douglas put the contrast well. On the one hand, ''The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private
needs . . . ." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). On the other, "[a]n act does not
cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently. The force and vitality ofjudicial decrees derive from more robust sanctions," McComb
v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949), and "[t]he measure of the court's power in
civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements offull remedial relief." 336 U.S.
at 193. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 281-82 (1977).
58. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 481-86 (1980); Comment, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial
Utilization of Neoreceiverships lo Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 WIS. L.
REV. 1161, 1165-72.
The equity receivership for the readjustment of the various classes of debt of an insolvent
corporation was well developed by the first decade of the twentieth century. See, e.g., In re
Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90 (1908); see I J. GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS§§ 10-13 (1936). The receivership itself involved the displacement of corporate management by the court-appointed receiver. As an ancillary matter, it encouraged the use of the
anti-obstruction injunction against third parties. See text at notes 97-101 infra.
Moreover, the corporate reorganization produced a device, the "protective committee,"
which strikingly prefigures the relation of the plaintiff class to its representative in structural
reform litigation. As a writer on corporate reorganization said during the Depression:
Theoretically, individual creditors and stockholders may prepare a plan of reorganization,
secure the approval necessary to propose the plan, and have the plan accepted and confirmed. Practically, however, this is possible only in the case of a small corporation where
the number of creditors and stockholders is small and the problems of readjustment are
simple. The engineering of a reorganization by the independent action of individual creditors or stockholders is generally impractical in the case of a large corporation.
The preparation and execution of a plan for a large corporation requires an intimate
knowledge of the business in which the debtor is engaged, a keen grasp of the debtor's
condition and the reasons why it finds itself in that condition, an appreciation of the
equities existing in favor of and against each interested group, an understanding of intricate financial ramifications and of many other kindred subjects which are beyond the
knowledge of the average creditor or stockholder. . . .
The most efficient way of gaining a division of expense among interested parties, so
that competent aids can be hired to prepare the plan, is by the use of a protective committee.
Protective committees are organized to represent the interests of a class or classes of
creditors or stockholders. The members of the committee are sometimes self-chosen,
sometimes designated by an individual oi: group of individuals, or by an organization, but
they are rarely elected by those whom they are organized to represent.
2 J. GERDES, supra, §§ 988, 990, at 1585-86. The protective committee represented those security holders ofits class who chose to adhere to it, proposed plans ofreorganization, obtained the
necessary consent, and scrutinized interim management. See Douglas, Protective Commillees
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strained by constitutional prohibition or self-imposed considerations
of comity, the federal courts have applied the full range of doctrines
for structuring equitable relief to public as well as to private defendants. Their potential power to coerce public defendants to obedience should therefore be examined in the same light.
The coercive resources of the equity court fall into three groups.
The first is the civil contempt sanction in which escalating penalties
are applied to the recalcitrant defendant until he complies with the
decree's command to act or forbear. Secondly, by way of ancillary
relief, the equity court may enjoin third persons, otherwise unrelated
to the matter, from abetting noncompliance by a defendant or from
·compelling noncompliance by a defendant otherwise prepared to
obey the court. Finally, in rem relief, in which the court or its officers themselves do that which the defendant has refused to do, has
developed to correct the occasional failure of civil contempt.
A.

Contempt

Historically, the primary recourse of the equity court has been
personal coercion of the recalcitrant defendant through the use of
the power to hold him in civil contempt until he complies. 59 The
essence of the civil contempt power is the indefinite cumulative sanction which continues until the defendant has purged himself of contempt by obeying the underlying order. 60 The most familiar of these
sanctions are the per diem fine and the continuing imprisonment of
the disobedient individual,61 but other devices are available. For example, the court may sequester property within its power and retain
it until compliance: this is a particularly useful technique when the
person to be coerced is, as a practical matter, beyond the power of
the court.62 In addition to coercing the defendant, the court may use
the civil contempt power to require him to compensate plaintiffs for
in Railroad Reorganizations, 41 HARv. L. REV. 565, 577 (1934); Rohrlich, Protective Committees, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 670, 676-86 (1932). Its members were not infrequently, and sometimes
justly, accused of conflicts of interest with those they represented. See Douglas, supra, at 56768. The relation of the plaintiff class to its self-appointed representatives is not dissimilar. See
Piss, supra note IO, at 19-21; Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 883-87.
59. See 2 E. DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
*1032-33; 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 1433 (4th ed. 1919); 1 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 90 {14th ed. 1918).
60. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43 (1911).
61. The cliched phrase is that the contemnors "carry the keys of their prison in their own
pocket" In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
62. See Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 764-65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 983 (1950); Grew v. Breed, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 363, 370 (1847); Miller v. Huddlestone,
22 Ch. D. 233, 234 (1882); 2 E. DANIELL, supra note 59, at *1050-51.
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the cost of his noncompliance, both for damages and litigation
expenses.63
Experience with litigation involving title or possession of property demonstrated that in personam coercion sometimes failed to
compel defendants to execute deeds or surrender possession of property as ordered.64 In most of the American states, statutes gave equity courts the power to transfer property directly by one of two
methods: either the court could appoint an officer to do the act with
the same legal effect as if the defendant had done it or, if the property were within the court's jurisdiction, the decree itself would
transfer title.65 Similarly, the court could issue a writ directing the
sheriff to place and maintain the plaintiff in possession. By the end
of the nineteenth century, these powers had become the norm for
state equity courts. They were expressly conferred on the federal
district courts in 1912 by Equity Rule 8,66 whose successor, Rule 70
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to
deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act
and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some
other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like
effect as if done by the party. On application of the party entitled to
performance, the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration
against the property of the disobedient party to compel obedience to
the judgment. The court may also in proper cases adjudge the party in
contempt. If real or personal property is within the district, the court
in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and such judgment has
the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. When any
order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in whose
favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon
application to the clerk.67

The powers enumerated in rule 70 have been applied not merely to
transfer real property,68 but to contract at the expense of a private
63. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978); United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448-49
(1911).
64. See 0. F1ss, INJUNCTIONS 710-11 (1972); 2 E. DANIELL, supra note 59, at *1048 n.8.
65. See 4 J. POMEROY supra note 59, § 1317.
66. Rules of Practice of the Courts of Equity of the United States, Rule 8, 226 U.S. 627,
651 (1912). See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, I Stat. 275,276, for the authority to promulgate the rules. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1002, at 34-35 nn.29-36 (1969) (discussing the rules governing equity in the federal
courts).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 70.
68. See, e.g., Buzzell v. Edward H. Everett Co., 180 F. Supp. 893, 902-03 (D. Vt. 1960).
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defendant for the abatement of a nuisance,69 to transfer possession of
personal property,70 and to perform an accounting which defendant
refused to do.71
Whether the relief sought is coercive or direct, 72 it is available
only to procure the effect of obedience to the court's orders. Put differently, the district court's inherent civil contempt power and its
powers under Rule 70 cannot be invoked by plaintiff unless the defendant has refused to act as some provision of the decree requires. 73
One recourse of the defendant in response to civil contempt charges
is therefore to deny that it has violated the decree, for without a violation, there can be nothing for civil contempt to remedy. 74 The remedial nature of the power also governs the response to two other
defenses commonly raised to civil contempt charges: impossibility of
compliance and lack of willfulness.
The purpose of conditional civil contempt sanctions is to compel
compliance with the decree. Accordingly, they may not be inflicted
on one who lacks the "present ability to comply," 75 since the injury
to the defendant would not result in a countervailing benefit to the
plaintiff. The temptation to assert this defense is evident,76 and the
judicial response has been to hedge it about with restrictive conditions. The party claiming impossibility must produce evidence of
and, apparently, prove in detail the circumstances that prevent compliance.77 He must demonstrate his own, diligent, good-faith efforts
to comply.78 These efforts, however, are not a defense in themselves.
69. Clarke v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 62 F.2d 440, 442 (10th Cir.) (decided under Equity
Rule 8), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 629 (1932).
10. In re Waltham Watch Co., 92 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D. Mass. 1950).
71. Standard Scale & Supply Co. v. Cropp Concrete Mach. Co., 6 F.2d 447,450 (7th Cir.
1925) (decided under Equity Rule 8).
72. I believe this terminology more clearly states the distinction between relief that depends on inducing the defendant to cooperate and relief that does not than the customary
terms, "in personani' and "in rem."
13. See Taylor v. Finch, 423 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 881 (1970);
Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 425 F.2d 1111, 1113 (3d Cir. 1970).
14. See Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1982); New York State Assn. for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163-65 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948); accord United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct.
1548, 1552 (1983); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
76. As Judge Leventhal put it, "An equity court can never exclude claims of inability to
render absolute performance, but it must scrutinize such claims carefully since officials may
seize on a remedy made available for extreme illness and promote it into the daily bread of
convenience." Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 713 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
77. See United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. 1548, 1552 (burden of production is on defendant); Fortin v. Commr., 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982) (burden of proof on defendant);
Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D. Mass. 1982) (burden of proof on defendant).
78. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
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They are only circumstantial evidence of objective impossibility.79
The fact that a party's efforts to date have not produced compliance
is not conclusive proof that it cannot be accomplished. 8° Finally, the
fact that compliance depends in part on the withheld cooperation of
others does not excuse a party from the duty to exert his own powers
as far as possible. s1
Good faith, diligent attempts to comply are circumstantial evidence of impossibility, but this principle is sometimes confused with
the proposition that a mistaken but good-faith belief that one is complying with a decree is a defense to civil contempt proceedings for
violating it. 82 It is not. Unlike criminal contempt,83 civil contempt
proceedings are concerned not with the defendant's attitude to the
court's authority but with assuring the plaintiff the fruits of his victory. 84 Non-compliance, for whatever reason, deprives him of that,
and, unless compliance is impossible, the threat of contingent sanctions can usually correct the situation. There are, therefore, numerous decisions to the effect that willful disobedience need not be
cf. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 77 (1948) (civil contempt sanction unjustified where disobedience was not willful or deliberate); Fortin v. Commr., 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982) (diligence relevant to issue of ability to comply).
79. See Fortin v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 790, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1982); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 531 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 672-73 (D.R.I. 1979).
80. See Fortin v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 790, 797 (1st Cir. 1982).
81. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1950); United Mine Workers v.
United States, 177 F.2d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949); Palmigiano v.
Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 671-72 (D.R.I. 1978).
82. The distinction between the two is clearly explained by Judge Swygert in Fortin v.
Commr., 692 F.2d 790, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1982).
83. Criminal contempt is a punitive sanction for past disobedience to an order, inflicted for
the purpose of vindicating the court's authority. Accordingly, it is prosecuted by the court
itself, is styled a criminal proceeding and survives the reversal of the underlying decree. Civil
contempt, in contrast, is prosecuted by a party as a part of the main action and is mooted by
reversal of the decree or settlement of the case. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 445-46, 451-52 (1911). Criminal contempt is treated much as any other crime; its
limits are defined by statute, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1982), and it may carry with it the sixth
amendment right to jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-08 (1968). It differs from
other crimes only due to the absence of the fifth amendment right to grand jury indictment, see
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 296 (1947); United States v. Bukowski,
435 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1970); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b); the substantive obligation to obey an
invalid decree, see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); and the vesting of
prosecutorial discretion in the court itself, see United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 100 (5th
Cir. 1965); Bame/I, 346 F.2d at 102 (Brown, J., dissenting), but if. Bamett, 346 F.2d at 104-08
(Wisdom, J., dissenting) (rejecting the proposition that the court should exercise its discretion
to refuse to pursue criminal contempt proceedings on the ground that such proceedings would
be contrary to the public interest because they might cause social unrest), all of which are
required by the need of the court to control the means of defending its own authority. From
this perspective, willfulness is merely the mens rea of this crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Baker, 641 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949).
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proved to establish civil contempt. 85

B.

Control of Third Parties

The traditional powers of a court of equity to procure compliance
extended beyond the parties named in the decree to three further
classes of persons: those subject to the decree because represented
by a party, those added as parties by the plaintiff to prevent them
from interfering with the execution of a decree and those required to
add themselves as parties in order to assert claims that might interfere with the decree. The first were "bound" by the main decree in
the sense that they could be subject to civil or criminal contempt
proceedings for causing a defendant to violate it. 86 As the law developed in the United States the second and third classes were not so
"bound" but could be made subject to further orders and to sanctions for violating these later decrees of the court.
A decree, of course, is a command to a specific party to do or
refrain from a more or less specific series of acts. Individuals and
organizations, however, may act through agents as well as by themselves; organizations necessarily act through the individuals of whom
they are composed. 87 In order to perfect their control over the defendants' actions, courts of equity have therefore long asserted the
power to hold in criminal or civil contempt persons acting either as
defendants' agents or knowingly cooperating with a defendant to
bring about behavior by the defendant contrary to the decree. 88 This
power and its limits are now codified for the federal courts by Rule
65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order . . . is
binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order
by personal service or otherwise. 89
85. See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); Fortin v. Commr.,
692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 670 (D.R.I. 1978),
qjfd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
86. Professor Fiss points out that an individual may be "bound" by an injunction in several senses: he may be unable to relitigate points because of res judicata or stare decisis; he
may be subject to criminal sanctions for interfering with its enforcement; or he may be subject
to civil or criminal contempt for violating its terms. 0. F1ss, supra note 64, at 620-21 ( 1972), I
use the term "bound" in this last, narrowest sense.
87. See United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1950); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, 376-77 (1911); Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624, 627 (1879).
88. See In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d
Cir. 1930); 2 E. DANIELL, supra note 59, at '"1673 n.1, '"1685 n.(a).
89. FED. R. C1v. P. 65(d).
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For reasons having to do with the due process rights of non-parties
to assert the legality of the conduct governed by the decree,90 the
cases applying Rule 65(d) have emphasized that it extends only to
acts on behalf of or in concert with the enjoined party and does not
apply the decree to independent acts of non-parties in pursuit of
their own interests. 91
Prior to the 1930 decision of Alemite Manufacturing Corp. v.
Staj/;92 and the promulgation of Rule 65(d) in 1938, a line of authority in England and the United States had held that a non-party acting independently with knowledge of the decree would be in
contempt ifhe willfully produced a result contrary to it. 93 While this
proposition has been in disrepute since Learned Hand rejected it in
90. See Chase Natl. Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934); Alemite Mfg.
Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors
to Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REV. 873, 892-97 (1975) (criticizing Judge Hand's due process analysis of the inadequacy of the principal's representation of the agent's independent interests in
Alemite); cf. notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
91. See Thompson v. Freeman, 648 F.2d 1144 (8th Cir. 1981); Royal News Co. v. Schultz,
350 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1965); Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. Pasco Intl
(London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1980) (any injunction against a
corporation also binds the agent to the extent of his agency); United Pharmaceutical Co. v.
United States, 306 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1962) (an injunction is not binding on an independent
corporation solely by virtue of its distributorship agreement with the enjoined corporation).
92. 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
93. See In re Reese, 107 F. 942 (8th Cir. 1901); Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545;
Rendleman, supra note 90, at 901-03, 908-10.
Seaward v. Paterson, on which this line of cases rests, appears to have been misunderstood
because it draws the distinction between civil and criminal contempt in a terminology not used
in the United States. The Court of Appeals opinions in that case, cited by Judge Hand in
Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930), carefully distinguish between
"breach of the injunction" and "contempt of court." As stated by Lindley, L.J.:
In the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the
purpose of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the "'other case the Court will not allow its process to be set at naught and treated with contempt. In the one case the person who is interested in enforcing the order enforces it for
his own benefit; in the other case, if the order of the Court has been contumaciously set at
naught the offender cannot square it with the person who has obtained the order and save
himself from the consequences of his act.
[1897] 1 Ch. at 555-56. Justice Rigby agreed that the case in question involved contempt "by
way of punishment" with the court acting ''upon its own authority." [1897] 1 Ch. at 558, 559.
The distinction corresponds exactly to the American one between criminal and civil contempt.
See note 83 supra.
Paterson, the defendant, had been enjoined from holding boxing matches on certain premises. [1897] 1 Ch. at 546-47. Murray, the contemnor, was the principal who had used Paterson
as his straw man. [1897] 1 Ch. at 556. He was found in contempt in the Chancery Division for
having aided and abetted Paterson in violating the decree by holding more boxing matches.
Both judges in the Court of Appeals agreed that Murray was not an independent actor but was
cooperating with Paterson. He received a fixed term of imprisonment. [1897] 1 Ch. at 552,
556-58.
It therefore appears that the result in Seaward, a criminal contempt conviction of one
knowingly assisting a party to violate a decree, would fall within the FED. R. C1v. P. 65(d)
concept of "active concert or participation." The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on
Murray's nonparty status goes to his possible nonliability for "breach of the injunction," or
civil contempt, which was not involved. [1897] 1 Ch. at 554. The broad reading given the case
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Alemite,94 another traditional doctrine has provided a basis to control nonparties. Chancery commonly took under its control, directly
or through receivers, specific property or legal entities, in order to
resolve multiple claims against them. To protect its power to determine the underlying dispute, the equity court would enjoin third
parties from attempting to interfere with its control of the res, either
by proceedings in other courts, 95 physical invasion,96 or obstruction
of operations by a strike. 97 Moreover, the order appointing the receiver itself served to prohibit any person with notice of it from enforcing claims against the res in another forum without the leave of
the court.98 As a result, independent nonparties could be made subject to the contempt power by a separate injunction directing them
not to obstruct the resolution of the case. 99 This principle has been
applied in recent cases, both to consolidate litigation in one forum 100
and, on the theory that the defendant institution is equivalent to a
res under the court's control, to keep independent third persons
from obstructing a defendant's compliance. 101
in In re Reese, 107 F. at 946-47, is simply incorrect. Bui cf. Rendleman, supra note 90, at 90809.
94. See Rendleman, supra note 90, at 907-08.
95. See J. POMEROY, supra note 59, §§ 1583, 1592.
96. See id. § 1585.
97. See id. § 1590, at 3742.
98. See id.§ 1592, at 3751-52 n.l.
99. See id. 3756 nn.7-8.
100. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 485 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Buffalo Teachers Fedn. v. Board of Educ. of Buffalo, 477 F. Supp. 691 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); New York State
Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85, 96-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
IOI. See Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96-97 (6th Cir. 1957); cf. United States v. Faubus,
254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958) (Governor of Arkansas violated school desegregation order by
using national guard troops to prevent black children from attending city high school). This
theory was most fully set out in Judge Wisdom's opinion in United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261
(5th Cir. 1972). The case arose out of an ex parle order entered at defendants' request in a
school desegregation case, which enjoined "all students at Ribault Senior High School .••
and other persons acting independently or in concert with them and having notice of this
order" from a variety of disruptive conduct that obstructed the peaceful desegregation of the
school. 472 F.2d at 262-63. The district court directed that Hall, an "outside agitator," be
personally served with the order. Hall, after being served, violated it independently four days
after it was issued and was convicted of criminal contempt. 472 F.2d at 263-64. The affirming
opinion analogized the order to an in rem injunction "binding on all persons, regardless of
notice, who come into contact with property which is the subject of a judicial decree." 472
F.2d at 265-66. The court also said that FED. R. C1v. P. 65(d) was merely declaratory of the
federal courts' inherent powers to issue such an order and did not restrict them. 472 F.2d at
267. However, the opinion qualified this broad sweep by noting that, since the contempt occurred within IO days of the order's issuance, the order could be regarded as an ex parte
temporary restraining order, valid under FED. R. C1v. P. 65(b), directed to Hall. 472 F.2d at
267.
Despite the seeming breadth of Judge Wisdom's language, it is by no means clear that the
order could have been enforced against anyone who happened to violate its terms or even
against Hall after the IO-day limit of rule 65(b) expired. See Rendleman, supra note 90, at 919-

August 1984]

Financing Structural Injunctions

C.

1833

Displacing the Defendant

Finally, in eisputes involving multiple claims to property, the
equity court had the power to safeguard the claimants' interests by
appointing a receiver for the property during the litigation. A late
nineteenth century treatise described the receiver's function as
follows:
By means of the appointment of a receiver, a court of Equity takes
possession of the property which is the subject of the suit, preserves it
from waste or destruction, secures and collects the proceeds or profits,
and ultimately disposes of them according to the rights and priorities
of those entitled . . . .102
22. But see Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Assn., 443 U.S.
658,692 n.32, mod!fied on rehg., 444 U.S. 816 (1979). If the order were not so broadly enforceable, the court could enjoin further interference only after an adversary proceeding in which
the "obstructor'' could assert any independent rights to pursue his conduct despite its effect on
the relations among the parties to the decree. See Herrlein v. Kanakis, 526 F.2d 252, 255 (7th
Cir. 1975); Rendleman, supra note 90, at 879-81, 886-88, 919-20. See generally FED. R. Crv. P.
65(a) (requiring notice to the other party before an injunction can be issued); National City
Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977) (overturning a district court injunction which
would have prohibited a nonparty from seeking relief in the state courts on an issue only
tangentially related to the federal action); Sims v. Green, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947) (requiring findings of irreparable harm before a temporary injunction would issue). The purpose of
the stay on other litigation in traditional receivership cases, on which Judge Wisdom relied for
his analogy, was not to prevent claims from being asserted, but rather to require them to be
asserted in the receivership court. See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 59, § 1592; cf. Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 485 F.2d 780, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (where federal law gives Courts
of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of an administrative agency, a district
court may not entertain an action challenging that body's ruling).
It should also be noted that Hall, like the contemnor in Seward v. Paterson, (1897] I Ch.
525 (discussed at note 93 supra), had been forbidden to take action that would prevent the
defendant from complying with the injunction and was held in criminal contempt for acting in
violation of this proscription. Neither case involved an affirmative duty imposed on an independent third party enforced by civil contempt to assist a defendant in complying. Absent
some independent legal duty which the third party had violated, it is doubtful that such an
obligation could be imposed in the present state of the law. Compare Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (federal courts may not order a suburban school
district to enter into a desegregation plan without showing that it was guilty of de jure segregation), with Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292-300 (1976) (limiting Milliken I by allowing a
remedial order against the Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) affecting an
entire metropolitan area where violations committed by HUD had occurred only in the inner
city).
However, in at least two instances, nonparty state officers who used their legal authority to
obstruct the performance of desegregation decrees were added as parties, enjoined from obstruction, and further enjoined to use their powers to impose compliance on subordinates.
United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1963); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 464-70, 478-79 (M.D. Ala. 1967), ajfd sub nom. Wallace v. United
States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 751-52
(M.D. Ala. 1964). In Lee, the district court found an independent legal duty under the fourteenth amendment for the state officials to further desegregation. 267 F. Supp. at 478. In
Barnell, the affirmative duty to maintain law and order was imposed on Governor Barnett only
after he was found in civil contempt of a prior order not to obstruct the admission of James
Meredith to the University of Mississippi.
102. 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 59, § 1483, at 3500-01 (quoting Beverly v. Brooke, 45 Va. (4
Gratt.) 187, 208 (1847)).
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The receivership was commonly used to liquidate or reorganize corporations and to protect beneficiaries, shareholders or creditors in
suits against corporate management or a fiduciary when the defendants' behavior indicated that they could not be trusted with possession of the res pending the outcome of the litigation. 103 As noted
above, the receiver often used the anti-obstruction injunction both to
compel outsiders to bring claims before the court that had appointed
him and to prevent anyone from interfering with his possession and
management of the res. 104 Since the appointing court had in personam jurisdiction of the parties to the underlying suit, the receiver
could obtain orders in that court directing the parties, their agents,
and persons holding through them, such as tenants, to tum the property over to him without any further service of process. 105 Against
nonparties, however, the receiver could assert claims for money or
property only in a forum where he could obtain in personam jurisdiction and only subject to any defenses the nonparties had against the
parties. 106 In other words, the receivership was a remedy among the
parties but created no substantive rights against others.
From the historical resources of equity, then, a federal district
court that has issued a structural injunction inherits a broad, powerful array of resources to meet the defendants' claim that financial
circumstances beyond their control have made it impossible to comply. It receives a narrow, skeptical view of the claimed impossibility,
based on an objective standard of performance that discounts expressions of good faith. It has a power of personal coercion that
103. See id§§ 1509, 1510, at 3559-61, § 1546, at 3636-37; I J. GERDES, supra note 58, § 13,
at 31-40. The following comment from Pomeroy has a familiar ring:
It is not uncommon, in railroad receivership cases, to find strong statements as to the great
reluctance of the courts to undertake the management of railroads, except in the most
urgent'cases; but the experience of the last twenty-five years has tended to raise the question in some minds whether these expressions are to be taken very seriously, or whether
the magnitude of the interests involved actually does - if, indeed it should - exercise
any strong deterring influence on the action of the courts.
4 J. POMEROY, supra note 59, § 1549, at 3661 (footnotes omitted). Compare Justice Brennan's
remarks on structural relief in prisons:
Thus the lower courts have learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience that
judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates - not to mention considerations of basic humanity - are to be observed in the prisons. No one familiar with the
litigation in this area could suggest that the courts have been overeager to usurp the task
of running prisons, which, as the Court today properly notes, is entrusted in the first instance to the "legislature and prison administration rather than a court."
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted). See also Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126, 1144-45 (5th Cir.), modffeed,
688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra
note 58, at 493-94.
104. See text at notes 95-99 supra.
105. See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 59, § 1582, at 3717-18.
106. See id § 1582, at 3719-20.
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extends not only to defendants but also their subordinates and those
who knowingly assist them. It has the power to withhold defendants' property from them, in order to coerce both defendants and
persons beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Where the defendants'
task has been made more difficult by independent persons such as a
legislature, it has the power to prohibit acts of obstruction, although
the power to command cooperation is more doubtful. Finally, it has
the power to take over the management of the defendants' institution
and safeguard its property, though this is limited with respect to
property held by a third party, such as a fiscal official, under claim of
right. .

III.

COERCING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DEFENDANT

At some point in a structural case, the court imposes an order on
the defendant executive agency that contains fairly specific objectives, directives for reaching them, an enforcement review mechanism and a timetable. 107 When, as often happens, deadlines pass
without compliance, civil contempt proceedings begin and defendants may try to excuse themselves on the ground that compliance
was financially impossible. This assertion can mean several things:
the budget is not big enough without cutting other activities with a
higher priority, 108 the legislature will not permit the agency to spend
appropriated funds to comply,1 09 or, finally, the legislature is unwilling or unable to appropriate as much as the agency needs. 110 Once
this point is reached, the trial court is faced with the three questions
with which the remainder of this Article is concerned. First, is the
supposed impossibility a good defense to the civil contempt charge?
Second, if not, how can the executive agency and its officials be most
effectively coerced to make more effective use of the resources at
hand? Third, if the resources at hand are not enough to achieve
compliance, can those who control the public treasury be compelled
to provide more and, if so, how?
The first two of these questions are addressed in this part of the
Article. Part IV is devoted to the third.
/

107. Since a consent decree is enforceable in the same way as any other injunction, this
discussion includes consent decrees. See Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1982);
Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 823-24 (D. Mass. 1982).
108. See notes 112-14 infra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 115-21 infra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 125-38 infra and accompanying text.
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The Impossibility .Defense

The preceding section pointed out that, while impossibility of
compliance is a defense to coercive civil contempt sanctions, the defendant bears the burden of convincing the court that it could not
comply despite diligent good-faith efforts. Courts handling structural litigation have preserved the traditional skeptical hostility to
this defense and most claims of financial impossibility are rejected.111 The false impossibilities fall into three main groups: mere
inefficiency, self-inflicted impossibility, and.legal impossibility. The
first two of these are straightforward. The courts have shown themselves unwilling to accept pleas of financial impossibility until satisfied that the executive branch defendants have used the money
allotted them in good faith and in an efficient manner to comply
with the decree. 112 This may involve detailed scrutiny of the defendants' planning in response to budget cuts, together with the requirement that the response minimize harm to the substantive portions of
the decree. 113 Moreover, "self-inflicted" impossibility, in which defendants deprive themselves of resources, meets no sympathy and
provokes unusually severe sanctions. 114 At the threshold, then, fiscal
impossibility can only be claimed plausibly when produced by factors beyond the executive defendants' control.
Legal fiscal impossibility is asserted when the agency has available enough appropriated funds to meet the decree's obligation but
contends that some provision of state law prohibits it from spending
111. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, (D. Mass.
1982); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), ajfd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); cf.
Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981) (failure of state to
finish its budgeting process is not a valid excuse for its late mailing of welfare checks).
112. E.g., Fortin v. Commr., 692 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1982); Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d I
(1st Cir. 1982); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817 (D. Mass. 1982); Perez v. Boston Housing
Auth., 379 Mass. 703,400 N.E. 2d 1231 (1980); cf. Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 623 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (school board which fails to provide for adequate compliance with a desegregation
order can be required to make complete financial accountings to the court in the future);
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1978) (where state officials were dilatory in
not correcting prison defects, they could be held in contempt and sanctions, including fines,
could be levied). These cases apply the principle of United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349,
356-57 (1950), that the alleged contemnor is responsible for doing all within his power despite
the noncooperation of others. Cf. Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82, 83 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(alleged contemnor liable even where injunction was issued against his predecessor in office).
113. Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 828-36 (D. Mass. 1982).
114. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631, 636-41 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), ajfd, 613 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); cf. Griffin v.
County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966) (holding state
officials in contempt for willful disbursal of money to schools while this act's legality was being
appealed even though the officials were under no specific prohibitory injunction).
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them that way. These legal restraints appear to fall into two categories. The most common is a state law prohibition of paying any
judgments against the state or its agencies without specific legislative
approval. 115 It is usually raised in response to orders requiring payment of attorneys' fees. In addition to such general restrictions, there
are several instances in which the state legislature included in the
specific appropriation for the defendant agency an express prohibition on using the appropriated funds to comply with provisions of a
particular structural decree. 116 Apart from questions of sovereign
immunity and comity 117 there is little doctrinal difficulty in pushing
these restraints aside. Cases involving nonfinancial, state-law restrictions on compliance with federal decrees clearly indicate that the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution118 requires a
state officer to act in accord with a valid federal decree regardless of
any prohibition or lack of authority created by state law. 119 If an
expenditure restriction conflicts with the decree, it would seem simple and proper to require the defendant to disregard it. If the agency
lacks enough money under its own control, the state's treasurer could
be added as an ancillary party and ordered to release funds on the
ground that his refusal to do so is obstructing the agency's compliance.120 In cases involving orders to pay attorneys' fees, this has
115. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-826 (Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-45-5
(1972); WASH. REV. CODE§ 4.92.040 (1983); see Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744-45
(9th Cir. 1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.3d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
994 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980), rehg. granted, 636 F.2d 942
(5th Cir. 1981).
116. E.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 473-74 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673
F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); New York State Assn. for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 164 (2d Cir. 1980).
California has unsuccessfully tried to prohibit the use of appropriated funds to pay awards
of attorneys' fees unless specifically authorized by the legislature. See California Budget Act
of 1980, § 4.5, 1980 Cal. Stal 510, § 4.5; Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1982); La
Raza Unida v. Volpe, 545 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
117. See notes 262-88 & 315-17 i'!fro and accompanying text.
118. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
119. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn.,
443 U.S. 658 (1979); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967); Gross v. Tazewell
County Jail, 533 F. Supp. 413, (W.D. Va. 1982); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 342 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972), ajfd, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144
(1974).
·
120. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631, 640 (E.D. Pa.
1981), ajfd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); see also Part IV
i'!fra; cf. Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1129-30 (8th Cir. 1977) (approving, under certain
circumstances, a court order "designed to short circuit ordinary legislative and administrative
processes involving the expenditure of state funds"). But cf. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869, 878-81 (E.D. Pa.) (concluding that the court lacked
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been done regularly.121
However, the judicial response has been more complex where
substantial operating funds are involved. While much judicial language states that refusal of the legislature to appropriate funds does
not excuse executive defendants from providing services or protecting rights as required by a structural decree, 122 this is not always the
result. Some consent decrees in institutional litigation merely obligate executive branch defendants to act "[w]ithin their lawful authority, including the State constitution and applicable State laws,
and subject to any legislative approval that may be required," 123 or
language to that effect. Under such a decree, the defendants are
obliged only to seek appropriations diligently and in good faith. If
they use their best efforts, and the legislature does not cooperate,
they do not violate the decree by then refusing to reprogram funds,
in violation of an otherwise valid general state law. 124
Apart from muttering threats and menaces, 125 few courts have
power to countermand the decision of a state legislature not to expend state funds on a certain
program), ajfd, 678. F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
It should be noted that most state constitutions, like the United States', prohibit dispensing
money from the treasury except by appropriation. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; e.g., ARK.
CONST. art. V, § 41; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 24; N.Y. CONST, art.
VII,§ 7; PA. CONST. art. III,§ 24; see Humbert v. Dunn, 84 Cal. 57, 24 P. I 1I (1890); Graham
v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966); Anderson v. Regan, 53 N.Y.2d 356,425
N.E.2d 792, 422 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1981); Ashbourne School v. Department of Educ., 43 Pa.
Comm. 593,403 A.2d 161 (1979). A proceeding against the state's disbursing officer necessarily involves overriding such a provision on supremacy grounds. See Spain v. Mountanos, 690
F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804, 806 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
121. E.g., Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1982); Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d
1203 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir,), rehg.
granted, 636 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1980); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 545 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Cal.
1982).
122. E.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Battle v. Anderson,
564 F.2d 388, 395-96 (10th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (5th Cir.
1974); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
123. New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163 (2d Cir.
1980); see also Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1, 4 n.3 (1st Cir. 1982).
124. Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); New York State Assn. for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus, one incentive for defendants to settle
structural litigation through a consent decree is the potential ability to limit the government's
financial exposure through such an agreemenL
125. A failure to fund could, therefore, raise the ~uestion as to whether these class members have now acquired a right to continued funding based on the leiµslative and executive branches' clear and ongoing commitment to the decrees. . . . Given an intransigent
legislature, essential remedial effort called for by the consent decrees may permissibly
have '. . . a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.' On that score, it is reasonable to have in mind the Governor's well publicized pronouncements that, under his
stewardship, the Commonwealth's treasury now enjoys a 100 million dollar surplus.
Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 827-28 (D. Mass. 1982) (citation omitted); accord Wyatt v.
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directly faced the issue of setting aside appropriation restrictions on
supremacy clause grounds. The results have been mixed where they
have tried to do so. In New York State Associationfor Retarded Children v. Carey, 126 the Second Circuit confronted the New York legislature's refusal to fund a monitoring committee estab~shed in a
"best efforts" consent decree. The Governor had sought appropriations diligently and in good faith. The district court had ordered the
Governor and Comptroller to make the money available despite
constitutional and statutory restrictions. The court of appeals reversed. While the entire panel found that the state's executive officers
had complied with the decree and were not in contempt, the majority
opinion went on to state that, despite the supremacy clause, the district court "ought not to put itself 'in the difficult position of trying to
enforce a direct order . . . to raise and allocate large sums of
money.' " 127 Instead, the majority said, the appropriate use of the
contempt power would be to shut down a noncomplying institution.
This would "[leave] the question of the expenditure of state funds in
the hands of citizens of the state, not in the hands of federal
judges.'' 128 The court considered this view particularly appropriate
when the money was to be used, not for direct compliance with constitutional standards, but for an ancillary expenditure.
The Third Circuit approved a similar approach to that of a district court in .Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania. 129 In
that case the Pennsylvania legislature had forbidden the use of appropriated funds for an automobile inspection system required by a
consent decree implementing the Federal Clean Air Act. The district court found the state defendants in contempt but refused to hold
that the appropriation restriction was void under the supremacy
clause. Instead, it ordered the United States, also a party, to withhold other funds from the state. 130 The Third Circuit affirmed withStickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (threat to sell state-owned land to finance
compliance), mod!fted sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally
Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 838.
126. 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
127. Carey, 631 F.2d at 165, (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333,341 (2d Cir. 1974)).
128. Carey, 631 F.2d at 165. But cf. Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. CL 1907 (1984), in which the Second Circuit affirmed a district court order that
required the Mayor and City Council of Buffalo to appropriate an additional $7.4 million
needed to comply with a school desegregation decree. Carey was not cited.
129. 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); see Clean Air Act
§§ 110(1)(2)(G), 172(b)(ll)(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(G), 7502(b)(ll)(B) (1982); 71 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 523 (Purdon 1981) (repealed 1983).
130. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869, 882-84 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); see Clean Air Act § 176(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (1982).
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out reaching the supremacy clause issue.13 1
In contrast, the Third Circuit did permit more direct relief in
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital 132 There the executive defendants, relying in part on an optimistic reading of Carey,
persuaded the Pennsylvania legislature to cut off further appropriations for the special master required by the primary decree. When
the executive defendants failed to pay the next installment of the
master's expenses, the district court found them in contempt and imposed a $10,000 per diem fine. 133 Civil contempt fines totalling more
than the amount of the needed appropriation were paid and were
applied by the district court to the master's expenses. 134 The Third
-Circuit affirmed, stating that the supposed legal impossibility could
not be used as a defense in the civil contempt proceeding when the
executive defendants had intentionally failed to raise the issue in an
orderly way by moving for a modification of the primary decree after the legislature acted. •35
These few cases have uniformly rejected the validity of a financial impossibility created by state law as an excuse for noncompliance, but they have shown a reluctance to ignore wholly the statelaw restriction and to attempt to draw directly on the state treasury
for the necessary funds. While the district court in Halderman
achieved that result indirectly, it must be pointed out that the state
defendants did not resist paying the contempt fines that were used to
finance the special master. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the
Third Circuit would have supported the district court's threat of direct relief had the state resisted. 136 The Eighth Circuit has avoided
131. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 476 n.14 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
132. 533 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1315 (1984).
133. Pennlzursl, 533 F. Supp. at 639-40.
134. Penn!zurst, 533 F. Supp. at 641. The district court paid the master's expenses out of
the $1.2 million in contempt fines paid by defendants, retained the balance and purged defendants of contempt. 533 F. Supp. at 647-48. The funds had apparently been paid out of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Funds. 533 F. Supp. at 646; Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d at 634-35 (3d Cir. 1982).
135. Pennlzurst, 613 F.2d at 636-39. The appropriate course, in the court of appeals' view,
would have been for the executive defendants to have moved to modify the order for paying
the master's expenses, under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5)-(6) in the light of the changed circumstances caused by the legislature's refusal to appropriate. 673 F.2d at 637-39. The course of
seeking modification under rule 60(b) has been followed, although without success on the merits, by other state agencies faced with refusal to appropriate. See, e.g., Fortin v. Commr., 692
F.2d 790, 799 (1st Cir. 1982).
136. The contempt decision was by a vote of 5-3, with one concurrence. Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315
(1984). The Third Circuit has been deeply divided on both the substantive rights involved and
the scope of the decree throughout the litigation. Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Hunter have
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the issue, 137 and the Second, in dictum, has expressed strong disapproval of direct :financial relief. 138 At the least, however, the cases do
accept the propriety of indirect pressure on the :financing body,
either by threatening to close the institution or by direct coercion of
the executive branch defendants.

B. Methods of Coercion of Executive Agency Officials
Coercion of responsible individuals through imprisonment or
fine is the oldest and most characteristic of equity's remedial sanctions. It is striking, however, how little it is used in institutional reform litigation even in the face of repeated, willful refusal to comply
with the decree. While it is unsafe to state a negative proposition
absolutely, I am aware of no federal case decided within the past
twenty-five years in which a public official has been imprisoned for
civil or criminal contempt for violating an injunction. This includes
such instances of flagrant defiance as the Commerce and Justice Departments repeatedly refusing to restore property in their possession
to its owners because the President disagreed with the court's decision, 139 Governor Barnett leading the resistance to the integration of
the University of Mississippi, 140 the Prince Edward County School
dissented at all points, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 640, 642
(3d Cir. 1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 662 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984), and Judge Garth has joined them on the scope of the
structural decree, 673 F.2d at 642; 673 F.2d at 662-67. Judge Aldisert, who dissented on the
merits in the original decision, concurred on the contempt decision but professed himself "disenchanted" with the decree and urged modification by the district court, 673 F.2d 628, 640 (3d
Cir. 1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 116 (3d Cir. 1979). It
appears likely from this distribution of votes that four judges, Seitz, Aldisert, Garth, and
Hunter, would not have supported the district court in stronger measures.
137. In Welsch v. Likens, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977), the district court had joined the
fiscal control officers of Minnesota as parties after the legislature did not appropriate funds to
implement a structural decree involving mental hospitals and enjoined them from obeying any
state law that would prohibit the executive defendants from drawing the necessary funds from
the state treasury. The court of appeals vacated, preferring to give the legislature another
chance. 550 F.2d at 1129-33. It intimated that shutdown, rather than direct financial relief,
was the district court's last resort. 550 F.2d at 1132 n.8.
138. New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.
1980).
139. See Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623, 626-32, 646-48 (D.C. Cir. 1951), vacated as moo/,
344 U.S. 806 (1952). See also Kearney v. United States, 285 F.2d 797, 798 n. 2 (Ct. Cl.) (listing
cases used in support of the companion case to Sawyer), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 935 (1961); see
generally Note, Collateral Estoppel and the .Dollar Litigation, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 749, 75054 (1952) (dealing with the general situation which gave rise to Sawyer, supra, and its companion cases).
140. See United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Valley v. Rapides
Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 934-35, 943 (5th Cir. 1981) (contempt order against a state
judge who had willfully thwarted a federal court's 16-year-old effort to desegregate the
Rapides Parish school system was dismissed when the judge promised not to continue his
actions), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
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Board disbursing tuition grants to segregated private schools before
it could be ordered not to do so, 141 the members of the Boston
School Committee knowingly submitting an inadequate desegregation plan and publicly stating that they would do no more than obey
the letter of direct court orders, 142 and the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare urging the legislature to cut
off funds for a special master that her Department opposed. 143
While the federal district courts have apparently been more willing
to impose per diem .fines for civil contempt, 144 the size of the .fines
and the fact that they are assessed against the officers in their official
capacity make it evident that they will be paid from official funds.
•The decisions reflect this understanding. 145 For practical purposes,
public officials are not held individually responsible for their failure
or refusal to comply with structural decrees. 146
The stated reason for this judicial tenderness is a combination of
divided responsibility, inefficacy and comity. Compliance with a
structural decree, it is said, requires the cooperation of a large
number of individuals among whom responsibility is divided in
making numerous discretionary decisions needed to operate a complex organization. 147 Individual fault for noncompliance is often difficult to determine, and successful compliance usually depends on
the good will of the defendants, which cannot be obtained by penalties.148 Moreover, individual sanctions are said to be inconsistent
141. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960
(1966); cf. United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) (citing a sheriff and deputies for contempt in negligently allowing a federal prisoner to be lynched).
142. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,427 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
143. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
q/fd., 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 622 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Watson Chapel School Dist. No. 24, 446 F.2d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1059 (1972); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 846 (C,D. Cal.
1974); vacated and remanded as moot, 537 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1976); Hamilton v. Love, 358 F.
Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
145. E.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 634-35 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984) ($10,000 per day fine against Secretary and Dept. of
Public Welfare, $1.2 million paid by the state); Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 622 F.2d
4, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) ($1,000 per day fine against Mayor, $200,000 paid); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692 (1978) (attorneys' fees awarded for litigation in bad faith "to be paid out
of Department of Correction funds"); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 673-74 (D.R.I.
1978) ("The court is aware that the final burden of the [contempt] fine [against the director of
the Dept. of Corrections] will fall on the taxpayers of Rhode Island •...").
146. This fact is, on its face, difficult to reconcile with the fiction of their personal responsibility used to avoid eleventh amendment immunity. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying
text.
147. See Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 839-40; Note, lmplemenlalion
Problems, supra note 2, at 432-34.
148. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 635 F.2d 556, 558 (6th Cir.), mod!fied, 642 F.2d 186 (6th Cir.
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with the duty to minimize, in the name of comity, federal judicial
intrusion into state institutions. 149 It should also be noted that the
federal courts' behavior in this area is consistent with the rapid
growth, in the past thirty years, of the good-faith immunity defense
to officials' liability for constitutional torts. 150
Thus, whether consciously or not, the federal courts have on the
whole taken the position that sanctions for an organization's failure
to comply with a structural decree are to be directed against the organization itself and not against the individuals through whom it
acts.1 51 To bring that organization into compliance the court has
several methods: the conditional and remedial fine, the appointment
of a receiver, sequestration and shutdown of the institution. 152 The
practical effects of these techniques may be fourfold: reprogramming the organization's budget, displacing recalcitrant individual
defendants, imposing undesirable side effects on the organization
and, finally, putting the plaintiff class out of defendants' power. The
imposition of fines or appointment of a receiver respond to claims of
financial impossibility by controlling expenditure directly; sequestration or institutional shutdown pressure both defendants and the
source of funds to provide more resources by threatening adverse
consequences if they do not.
1.

Conditional and Remedial Fines

The contempt proceedings in Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hospital 153 provide an illustration of the use of the conditional and remedial fine. The official defendants had procured the
appropriation restriction that made their budget unavailable to pay
for the special master. The district court first found them in con1980); Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82, 85 (N.D. Ohio 1976); see also Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 839-40, nn.464-71 (setting forth reasons why contempt citations
may fail to induce compliance).
149. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978).
150. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See generally Castro, Innovation in the Defense
of Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 47 TENN. L. REV. 47, 54-73 (1979); Newman, Suing
The Law Breakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedyfor Law E,iforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447, 459-60 (1978).
151. But cf. Lasky v. Quinlan, 419 F. Supp. 799, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated, 558 F.2d
1133 (2d Cir. 1977) (sheriff held in contempt).
152. These techniques may be imposed by ancillary orders, which in this sense go beyond
the normal process of tightening the substantive and procedural requirements of the main
decree. See text at note 34 supra;see also Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (11th
Cir. 1982) (discussing the various sanctions available to the court), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1773
(1983).
153. 533 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1981), ajfd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1315 (1984).
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tempt for nonpayment and imposed a substantial coercive per diem
fine. 154 As the payments accumulated, they were applied to the
master's expenses, and the contempt was ultimately purged. 155 The
expenses involved were in the nature of court costs, ancillary to the
main relief, and the court could pay them from accrued fines without
further intrusion into defendants' internal affairs. However, other
federal courts have suggested or threatened that accumulated coercive fines could be used to benefit prisoner plaintiffs directly 156 or
spent to abate a nuisance. 157 The legal basis for using the funds in
this manner is the court's traditional power, incorporated in Rule 70
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to appoint an agent of the
court to perform an act which the defendant has refused to perform.158 As a practical matter, if the "act" involved were intertwined
with the continuing operation of the institution, appointing such an
agent would amount to a partial displacement of the defendants and
would be subject to the restrictions on that form of relief. 159 A more
limited form of intrusion, applied by the district court at one point in
the Cleveland school desegregation litigation, is to meet claims of
:financial impossibility by ordering defendants to appropriate the
proceeds of the sale of specific property within their control to costs
of compliance. 160 The common element is the direct control by the
court of the expenditure of funds under defendants' control. In effect, the court reallocates defendants' budget to meet the decree's
priorities.
2.

.Displacement of Officials

When faced with continuing lack of cooperation by official defendants, the court may oust them from control over the institution
and replace them, at least for a time, with individuals willing to comply with the decree. The court may displace them totally with a re154. 533 F. Supp. at 639-40.
155. 533 F. Supp. at 639-40.
156. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 672-73 (D.R.!. 1978).
157. Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 622 F.2d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1980).
158. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text; see also Clarke v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
Co., 62 F.2d 440 (10th Cir.) (affirmed lower court's order allowing the marshal to remove a
nuisance that defendant failed to remove), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 629 (1932).
159. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
160. See Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 623, 624-25 (N.D. Ohio 1979). At an earlier stage
of the Reed litigation, the district court had ordered the Cleveland School Board not to make
payments on its debt in order to release funds for compliance; the order was stayed pending
findings on the issue of discrimination. National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.
1977). In Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (M.D. Ala.), modified sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the district judge threatened to sell land under the
control of the executive branch defendants if necessary to fund compliance.
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ceiver, 161 may appoint officials within the organization to coordinate
compliance 162 or may direct that particular functions be performed
by outsiders brought into the organization for the task. 163 In each
instance, the appointed person is not an outside adversary: he exercises managerial control from within the institution to the extent of
his appointment. 164 Displacement is thus one of the most intrusive
coercive devices, and it is generally considered an abuse of discretion
to use it until defendants have repeatedly shown that they will not
comply because of willful defiance or gross ineptitude. 165
If these preconditions are met, displacement by a receiver may be
an effective and permissible response to repeated claims of the type
of financial impossibility involved in Ricci v. Okin. 166 There the
court was faced with unilateral decreases in staff, contrary to a consent decree, in response to the Governor's instructions to cut the personnel budget by $5.1 million. In finding that defendants had failed
to comply with the consent decrees, the district court found itself
reviewing the defendants' planning and budgeting procedures in
considerable detail. 167 That work could have more effectively been
done by a receiver. Direct control of the budgeting process and
161. E.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), ajfd sub nom. Morgan v.
McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976).
162. For example, in Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 252, 402-03 (N.D. Ohio), ajfd in part,
635 F.2d 556 (6th Cir.), mod!fted, 642 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1980), the district court directed the
appointment of a single official in the Cleveland school system with authority to coordinate all
activities related to complying with the desegregation decree. See also Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 831-34.
163. For example, the district judge in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 333 (M.D. Ala.
1976), affd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
915, revd in part by companion case, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978), ordered the officials in charge of the Alabama prison system to contract with the University of Alabama Dept.
of Correctional Psychology to classify the inmates. After the contract was completed, the court
of appeals expressed disapproval of the order, apparently because it thought it more intrusive
than the situation warranted. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d at 290. See also New York State
Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (7 of the 27 buildings
at a state developmental center for the mentally handicapped turned over to a private agency
for complete operation and control).
164. See, e.g., Perez v. Boston Housing Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 735-38, 400 N.E.2d 1231,
1250-52 (1980); Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 831-37, 841-42. Not infrequently the court will appoint someone who already has authority over the defendant institution. The effect of the receivership is then to make him solely and directly responsible to the
court and relieve him from internal constraints. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d
527 (1st Cir. 1976) (Superintendent of Schools appointed receiver of South Boston High
School), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala.
1979) (Governor appointed receiver of Board of Corrections).
165. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533-35 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Perez v.
Boston Housing Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 735-38, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1250-52 (1980); see also Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 12, at 835-37, 836 n.430.
166. 537 F. Supp. at 817 (D. Mass. 1982).
167. Ricci, 537 F. Supp. at 828-36.
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detailed management by a knowledgeable official dedicated to compliance may be necessary to satisfy the court and the plaintiffs as to
precisely what it is possible to accomplish with the resources at the
defendant's disposal. 168 If such an official fails to attain compliance
because of lack of resources, the court's attention must tum to the
ultimate sources of funds.
3.

Sequestration

Both sequestration and shutdowns indirectly coerce the defendant, as well as the political audience, including the legislature,
through unpleasant collateral consequences. Historically, a plaintiff
could coerce an individual who was not responsive to fine or imprisonment to comply with a decree by detaining his property under a
writ of sequestration. This process was employed against both private169 and municipal 170 corporations in lieu of imprisonment. It
could also be applied to the property of a party to induce a nonparty interested in that property to cooperate in complying. 171 In
Gautreaux v. Romney, 172 when the nonparty city of Chicago prevented the defendant Chicago Housing Authority from building
public housing in compliance with the decree, the district court used
a technique similar to sequestration by ordering the defendant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development not to pay federal Model
Cities funds to the city until it cooperated. That order was reversed
by the Seventh Circuit in an opinion that set limits on quasi-sequestration of federal funds owed to state and local govemments. 173 The
funds in question were to be used to provide services to the predominantly nonwhite urban poor population of Chicago. As far as the
record showed, they had been used lawfully, and the activities they
168. It would be less intrusive for a monitor or an expert, responsible to the special master,
to scrutinize the agency's budget process as it proceeds. See, e.g., Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 746-47 (6th Cir. 1979).
169. E.g., Grew v. Breed, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 363 (1847); see Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 764-65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950); 2 E. DANIELL,
supra note 59, at • 1050-S I, • 1053 n.4.
170. E.g., Spokes v. Banbury Bd. of Healtb, I L.R.-Eq. 42, SI (V.C. 1865).
171. The court of appeals suggested this procedure in Kroese v. General Steel Castings
Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950), in which the defendant corporation allegedly could not declare a dividend, as it had been ordered, because a majority of its
board of directors, who were not parties and could not be found in the jurisdiction, would not
vote for one. The Third Circuit believed that sequestering the corporation's bank account
would make the directors see reason. 179 F.2d at 164-65.
172. 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971), revd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
173. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982);
United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 460 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 616 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1980).
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supported were not involved in the litigation. As the court of appeals saw the situation, the certain loss to the beneficiaries of the
Model Cities Program (many of whom belonged to the plaintiff
class) if the funds were cut off outweighed the possible coercive effect
on the city. Accordingly, it reversed for abuse of discretion and
remanded. 174
In a subsequent decision, however, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's suspension of the distribution of general revenue
sharing funds to Chicago as a means of compelling the city to end
racial discrimination in its police department. 175 Gautreaux was distinguished on the ground that the funds in the instant case were payable to a contumacious party and had been used in large part to fund
the police department which was the focus of the wrongful conduct.176 The Third Circuit has also clarified the limits of Gautreaux
in Delaware Valley Citizens Council v. Pennsylvania. 177 As noted
above, 178 the Pennsylvania legislature had refused to appropriate
funds needed to comply with a consent decree establishing an antipollution vehicle inspection system, and the district court had responded by ordering the federal Department of Transportation not
to pay highway construction and maintenance funds to the state
highway department until the state complied. 179 In affirming, the
court of appeals held that, in contrast to Gautreaux, the district court
had acted within its discretion. The Third Circuit cited four reasons:
174. Gautreaux, 451 F.2d at 128.
175. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), affg. in part 411 F.
Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 932 (1978).
It should be noted that the general revenue sharing statute itself prohibits racial discrimination by governments receiving funds under it, 31 U.S.C. § 6716(a) (1982), and gives the Attorney General and private persons a right of action to enforce that prohibition by measures
including the termination, suspension, or escrow of payments. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6720-21 (1982).
The nondiscrimination and federal action provisions appeared in the original statute. See
Pub. L. 92-512 § 122(a), (c), 86 Stat. 919,932 (1972). They were clarified, and the private right
of action added, in 1976. See Pub. L. 94-488, § 7(b), 90 Stat. 2341, 2349-50 (1976); S. REP. No.
1207, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5151, 518384; H.R. REP. No. 1720, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 5188, 5205. The statute was renumbered, without substantive change, when title 31 was
codified and enacted into positive law in 1982. See Pub. L. 97-258, 96 Stat. 1010, 1024-25,
1027-28 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. l, 3-4 reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1895, 1895-98.
176. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1977).
177. 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), '!/lg. 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969
(1982). Since the United States was one of the plaintiffs, the Third Circuit concluded Pennsylvania could be made a defendant without eleventh amendment problems. See 678 F.2d at
415. But cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 909 (1984) (where
the Supreme Court stated that the presence of the United States as a party does not affect the
eleventh amendment immunities of a state defendant vis-a-vis private parties).
178. See text at notes 129-31 supra.
179. Delaware Valley, 533 F. Supp. at 884.
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the funds were being denied to a contumacious party; the decision
was not inconsistent with the policy underlying the funding program; spending the funds would contribute to solving the pollution
problem that the primary decree was intended to remedy; and any
collateral harm to the road-using public in Pennsylvania could be
ended by the action of their legislators. 180
The object of quasi-sequestration is to get executive branch defendants to comply by holding hostage funds for activities they want
to pursue. 181 While it acts on them, it can also be expected to influence the attitude of a legislature which also favors the use to which
the sequestered funds would be put, giving that body the unpleasant
choice between foregoing the suspended program or finding the
money to replace the sequestered funds. 182 The drawbacks of this
method of coercion are the harm to the innocent members of the
public who benefit from the progFam funded by the sequestered
money and also the administrative inconvenience to the federal
funding agency. The few cases involving such quasi-sequestration
have therefore limited its use to instances where the source of federal
funds was before the court, 183 the recipient was not in compliance
and withholding would not be an abuse of discretion. On the latter
point, the district court has been required to take into account the
effect of suspension on program beneficiaries, the relation of the pro180. Delaware Valley, 618 F.2d at 478-79.
181. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 551 F. Supp. 827, 833-34
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
An interesting example of sequestration as a coercive device is Dowdell v. City of Apopka,
511 F. Supp. 1375, 1383-84 (M.D. Fla. 1981), mod!fted, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983), in
which the district court found the city had intentionally failed to provide street paving, water
and sewer services to black neighborhoods in violation of the fourteenth amendment, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), and the Revenue Sharing Act, 31
U.S.C. § 6716{a) (1982). The interim remedy was an injunction prohibiting defendants from
spending "any funds on the construction or improvement of municipal services in the while
community until such time as the street paving, storm water drainage and water distribution
systems in the black community are on par with that of the white sections." 511 F. Supp. at
1384. See also note 175 supra and accompanying text.
182. See Delaware Valley, 618 F.2d at 478-79; Dowdell, 551 F. Supp. at 834.
183. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972) (Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development named as a co-defendant, charged with aiding and abetting the Chicago
Housing Authority's allegedly discriminatory policies); see a/so United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 439-42 (7th Cir. 1977) (action consolidating two private anti-discrimination
suits with action brought by the United States), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 932 (1978); Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.) (consolidation of a pri•
vate suit with one brought by the United States), ajfd., 618 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 969 (1982). But cf. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981)
(revenue sharing funds sequestered despite lack of a federal party), mod!fted, 698 F.2d 1181
(11th Cir. 1983). The court in Dowdell acted, however, by ordering local defendants to pay the
funds over after they had been received from the federal government. 511 F. Supp. at 1386.
Moreover, the court had explicit statutory authority to act in this manner. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 6721 (1982).
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gram to the purposes of the primary decree, and the likelihood that
any harm to beneficiaries will be offset by compliance or prevention
of further harm to the plaintiffs. 184
4.

Shutdown of the Institution

The most extreme sanction is to shut down the institution and, in
some cases, release the inmates if the executive branch defendants
will not or cannot bring it into compliance with the substantive standards of the decree. Shutdown is a permissible sanction because of
the conditional nature of the defendants' duties: they may not operate the institution unless they observe plaintiffs' federally protected
rights in the process, though they need not necessarily operate the
institution at all. 185 Shutdown is often threatened as a response to
:financially based noncompliance. 186 However, the threats rarely
tum into action even in the face of continuing noncompliance. 187
Shutdown is the nuclear deterrent of structural litigation, threat184. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478-79 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
185. See notes 279-84 infra and accompanying text.
186. E.g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 165 (2d
Cir. 1980); Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1132 n.8 (8th Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F.
Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 160, 358 A.2d 457, 459,
modified, 10 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
187. Most actual shutdowns involve the closure of uninhabitable portions of prisons, e.g.,
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D.R.!. 1977), ajfd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 490 (N.D. Miss.), ajfd, 501
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 428 (E.D. Okla. 1974), qffd,
564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977). In Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y.), qffd,
,527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975), New York City closed the Manhattan House of Detention (the
"Tombs") and transferred the inmates rather than renovate the facility. Cf. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98 (1st Cir. 1978) (in which the court, citing unconscionable delay, ordered the Charles St. Jail to close six months after the date of the opinion).
Similar to shutdowns are injunctions limiting the number of detainees to the institution's capacity. E.g., Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 899 (M.D. Fla. 1975), qffd in part, 563 F.2d
741 (5th Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
In Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1315-17 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1773 (1983), the district court, after a history of violation of a structural consent decree, attempted to reduce overcrowding by ordering the release of 627 named inmates of the Alabama
Prison System. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the new order was improper until it
was shown that contempt proceedings could not produce compliance and that, in any event,
the district court abused its discretion by designating individual prisoners for release. 683 F.2d
at 1318-20; cf. Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1044-46 (5th Cir. 1980); Union County Jail
Inmates v. Scanlon, 537 F. Supp. 993, 1011 (D.N.J. 1982).
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court finally obtained compliance with its
decree regarding financial support for public schools, Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351
A.2d 713 (1975), by forbidding the expenditure of state funds for support of the public schools
after July 1, 1976. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The legislature
enacted satisfactory income tax and school aid measures before the school year began in September and the injunction was lifted. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 821 (1977); Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Srudy in
Judicial Se!fLegitimization, 8 RUT-CAM. L.J. 508, 518 n.83 (1977).
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ening to destroy the institution in order to save it. It works on two
assumptions: that the legislature would rather provide the necessary
money than see the institution closed and, if not, that the plaintiff
class will benefit from the shutdown more than the defendants and
the public will be harmed by it. The first is only plausible when there
is a broad-based constituency beyond the friends of the plaintiff class
who demand that the institution stay open. When this assumption is
weak, the court's threat is an empty bluff. It is perhaps true that
political decision makers are willing to pay any price to keep open
the prisons and those mental institutions whose inmates would be a
danger to the public if released. There may likewise be a general
demand that the schools remain open. 188 However, when merely
"benevolent" institutions, such as institutions for the mentally handicapped or non-dangerous mentally ill are concerned, the threat with
which the court is trying to raise money is merely the forced abandonment of what may be seen as a public charity whose inmates will
be a burden only on their families or, at worst, an unsettling public
presence in some communities. 189 Without the incentive generated
by a broad-based benefit, the political will to pay for benevolent institutions may be weak enough that the legislature would consider
shutdown to be a viable alternative to the costs imposed by the
decree.
Shutdown is frequently not a credible threat for another reason.
When a benevolent institution is involved, the plaintiff class does not
want to be released from its relation to the state. Instead it wants
better services from the state than it has been getting. Putting its
members on the street is not the way to get them. The plaintiff class
in prison litigation, it is true, would be happy to end their dependance on the state, and shutdown is thus a more plausible threat in
these cases. 190 However, the gain to such plaintiffs, duly convicted
criminals, would be both a windfall beyond their rights under the
primary decree 191 and a genuine and substantial injury to the public
among whom they would be released. Therefore, while the threat of
shutdown has some use in prison cases, its effect on its supposed ben188. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 187. This demand is not inexhaustible,
however, and there are instances of public schools being closed because of voter rejection of
tax increases. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1977, at 22, col. 3 (Ohio); id., Oct. 30, 1977, § 4, at
4, col. S (Toledo, Ohio).
189. See People of New York ex rel Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Corp., 69S F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1982); Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1980, § 2, at
7, col. 1.
190. See note 187 supra.
191. See Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 1982).
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eficiaries makes it a weak device for coercing the legislature in other
institutional litigation.
IV.
A.

PROCEEDING AGAINST THE FISC

Preliminaries: Why and How

Responding to claims of financial impossibility by coercing the
defendant institution has inherent limits. If the contempt power is
used to reallocate funds under the control of the executive branch
defendants, it operates within the limits of their total budget. Even if
the defendants are displaced by court appointed actors without
more, the new management merely stands in the financial shoes of
the old. The court is constrained in putting indirect pressure on the
legislature through quasi-sequestration by the potential collateral
harm to innocent beneficiaries of the withheld funds. Finally, the
threat of shutdown is not a plausible one except for instances such as
prisons and schools, and there the collateral harm to the public limits
its usefulness. A legislature that is recalcitrant either because of
political hostility to the decree or because of genuine lack of resources to meet the demand for essential public services can withstand indirect pressure if it has the political will. Whether the
legislature successfully resists or ultimately provides the funds, 192 the
process of indirect financial pressure through the executive branch
defendants is time consuming and full of friction because it consists
in large part of bluff and counter-bluff. 193 Both plaintiffs' interests in
the fruits of the new decree and the court's interest in its own efficiency and authority therefore press toward direct proceedings
against the source of funds as a more effective means of obtaining
compliance. 194
192. Compare New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.
1980) (court reversed contempt order against the Governor when he was unable to provide
funding for review panel for institution due to lack of appropriation by legislature), with
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 599 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1979) (court of appeals remanded case for
further consideration after legislature approved required funding to attain goal of the injunction); see Note, Federal Courts and State Prison Reform: A Formula for Large Scale Federal
Intervention into State Affairs, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 545, 575 (1980).
193. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 258-59; Note, Implementation Problems, supra note
2, at 454-55; Note, Federal Courts and State Prison Reform, supra note 192, at 575.
194. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1129-31 (8th Cir. 1977); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631,640 (E.D. Pa. 1981), ajfd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1110, (E.D.N.Y.), revd, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869, 880-81 (E.D. Pa.), ajfd, 678 F.2d 470 (3d.
Cir.) (where it is clear the Co=onwealth defendants are physically, practically and financially able to comply with the consent decree and there is no legal barrier to implementation,
then proceeding against the fisc is an effective means of obtaining compliance), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 969 (1982).

1852

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 82:1815

If there is substantive authority to proceed against a government
treasury, the mechanics of the operation are relatively simple.
Under Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 195 the court's
order to the state disbursing officer to pay the required amount will
have the same effect as if the executive branch defendant had drawn
the funds under valid state law.1 96 Some courts have also issued
writs of execution against government bodies under Rule 69 of the
Federal Rules.1 97 The utility of this practice is limited, however, because the rule authorizes execution "in accordance with the practice
of the state where the district court is held" and many states restrict
or prohibit execution against government funds or property. 198
While the exercise of some judicial ingenuity permits this stricture to
be avoided,1 99 a Rule 70 order directed to the disbursing officer or to
a bank holding government funds 200 is the more straightforward and
certain method.
The real problem is not with the mechanics of the order but with
the existence of substantive authority to issue it. If the executive
branch defendants are state officers or agencies, the attempt to proceed against the treasury raises questions of eleventh amendment
immunity. No such problems are involved if the defendants are a
195. See text at note 67 supra for the content of this rule.
196. See Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744-47 (9th Cir. 1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana,
622 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268,
1271 (5th Cir. 1980), rehg. granted, 636 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981).
197. See, e.g., Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936
(1982); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 545 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Cal. 1982). FED. R. C1v. P. 69(a)
provides in pertinent part:
The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment,
and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and
procedure of the state in which the district court is held ... except that any statute of the
United States governs to the extent that it is applicable.
198. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-45-5 (1972); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5207 (McKinney 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 21-32-14 (1979); WASH, REV. CODE ANN.§ 4.92.040
(1983); cf. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-826 (1982) (establishing reporting requirements for
judgments against the state); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 27A.6458 (Callaghan 1977) (court judgment
against the state to specify the agency from whose appropriation judgment shall be paid).
199. In La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 545 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. Cal. 1982), the district court
found that 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes an award of attorneys' fees, was a "statute of the
United States" within the meaning of rule 69(a). It is arguable that substantive statutes such as
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) were not intended to be included in this language. See FED. R. CIV. P.
69(a) advisory committee note.
200. The writ of sequestration was available in equity for use as a collection device in the
same manner as garnishment, at least when the third party did not contest that the funds in his
hands were owed to the defendant in the main action. See Grew v. Breed, 53 Mass. (12 Met.)
363, 370 (1847); Miller v. Huddlestone, 22 Ch. D. 233 (1882). When there is substantive authority for an order, FED. R. CIV. P. 71 permits process to be directed to non-parties as if they
were parties. See generally 12 C. WRIGHT&A. MILLER, supranote 66, §§ 3031, 3033. Such an
order would clearly entail less confrontation with state authorities than one directed to the
disbursing officer.
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local government or its officers - the eleventh amendment does not
apply to local government units. 201 Moreover, since Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York202 and Owen v.
City ofIndependence,2°3 local governments may be sued in their own
name under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for both injunctive relief and compensatory damages arising from government policy that violates the
Constitution or a federal statute. However, the direct enforcement
against either a state or local government treasury of the indefinite
future financial obligations of a structural decree, with its concomitant effect on the political decision to tax and appropriate, raises serious questions of comity under the present Supreme Court's view of
the appropriate relationships between the federal courts and state
and local governments.
B.

Ex parte Young and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

If a state officer or agency is the executive branch defendant, the
attempt to proceed directly against the treasury reaches the limit of
the convenient fiction erected in Ex parte Young 204 whereby a federal court may enjoin the acts of a state government without falling
foul of the eleventh amendment. 205 The Young doctrine permits the
federal courts to issue both prohibitory and mandatory injunctions
against acts of state executive officers that violate federal law on the
ground that the acts, if unconstitutional, are not the state's and therefore not immune. In the words of the opinion:
The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an
official claims to be acting under the authority of the State. The act to
be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of
the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which
does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is
simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by
the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in
201. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,690
n. 54 (1978); Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,280 (1977).
202. 436 U.S. 658 {1978).
203. 445 U.S. 622 {1980).
204. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
205. "Eleventh amendment" is used in the sense of the entire body of law governing state
immunity from suit in the federal courts. See note 27 supra.
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his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State
has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States.206

Under the pretense that the officer is being held personally responsible for acts beyond his legal authority, 207 he, or his successors
in authority,2°8 are subject to the federal court's control of their future official behavior. Since the state government, as an entity, can
act only through its individual officers, the effect of the injunction is
therefore to control the action of the state, or at least its executive
branch, as effectively as if the state had been enjoined in its own
name. 209 The Young doctrine is at the source of the federal court's
power to protect affirmatively federal rights against the unconstitutional implementation of state law.210 Though a transparent fiction,211 its "evident necessity" 212 renders its existence secure.
The eleventh amendment forbids unconsented suit in the federal
courts by an individual against a state in its own name for any type
of relief. 213 Given Young, it would be superfluous, indeed a "gross
pleading error,"214 for a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief based on
federal law against state executive action to name the state as a
206. 209 U.S. at 159-60.
2([/. Despite the officer's supposedly "personal" and ''unauthorized" use of the state's authority, his acts constitute "state action" for the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1913).
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2S(d)(l); Maria Santiago v. Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana,
554 F.2d 1210, 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), ajfd.,
328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1964). For an injunction to apply against a successor, however, there
must be some indication that the unlawful practice continues under his administration. See
Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514, 520-23 (1974); Sarteschi v. Burlein, 508 F.2d 110, 114 (3d
Cir. 1975).
209. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502-04 (1887); Maria Santiago v. Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana, 554 F.2d 1210, 1212 (1st Cir. 1977); cf. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
366-77 (191 I) (subpoena issued to "corporation" is binding on those individuals who comprise
entity).
210. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) ("[Young] has permitted the Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those
whom they were designed to protect.").
211. The cases referring to the Young doctrine as a fiction are legion. For recent examples,
see Jackson v. Hyakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir. 1982); Downing v. Williams, 624 F.2d
612, 626 n.21 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 645 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1981); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573
F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d
150, 156 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); Maria Santiago v. Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana, 554 F.2d 1210, 1212 (1st Cir. 1977); Hucker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1243-44
n.4 (6th Cir. 1976).
212. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-38, at 146 (1978). In its recent holding that the eleventh amendment prohibits a federal injunction against a state officer's viola•
tion of state law, the Supreme Court's majority opinion reiterates the fictitious underpinnings
of Young as an anomalous, but essential, protection of the supremacy of federal law. See
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
213. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
214. L. TRIBE, supra note 212, § 3-35, at 133.
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party. One does not, however, avoid eleventh amendment immunity
merely by designating an executive officer or agency as defendant
and enjoining the officer or agency to disburse funds. It is well settled that the substance of the relief sought, rather than the name of
the defendant, governs eleventh amendment immunity; the state
may be the real party in interest although an officer or agency is
named as defendant.2 1s
Against what relief, then, does the eleventh amendment provide
immunity? Essentially, it protects the state against federally-based
claims for monetary relief that will necessarily be borne by the state's
treasury. 216 The clearest instance is the money judgment against the
state or a disbursing officer in his official capacity.217 However, the
Supreme Court has also applied it to preclude specific enforcement
of accrued state obligations by injunction against officers where the
effect on the treasury would be equivalent to that of a money judgment.218 Regardless of form, the substance of the immunity has been
215. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,463 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 50 (1944); In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 465 (1887).
216. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 909-11 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663 (1974); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v Read, 322 U.S. 47, 49-51
(1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
217. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
218. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974), which cites In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887), and Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886), two cases which arose from the rash
of post-Reconstruction defaults on Southern state bonds.
The leading case in this line is Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883), which grew out of
an issue of$15 million in seven percent bonds by the Reconstruction-era government of Louisiana, backed by a dedicated property tax and by an amendment to the state constitution
declaring the bonds to be a contract. A "Board of Liquidation" consisting of the governor,
lieutenant governor, treasurer, auditor, and several other state officers was established to collect the tax and pay the bonds. In 1880, the post-Reconstruction government amended the
constitution to reduce the interest rate on the outstanding bond coupons to between two and
four percent and to limit the total state property tax to an amount insufficient to pay their face
value. 107 U.S. at 713-16. Bondholders brought suit against the Board members under the
contract clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, for a mandamus compelling them to pay the
defaulted coupons at face value. The federal circuit court denied the relief as being, in effect, a
suit against the state. 107 U.S. at 719.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The opinion conceded that Louisiana had breached its contract with the bondholders. 107 U.S. at 721. In passing, the Court stated that the eleventh
amendment would prohibit suit directly against the state by out-of-state bondholders. 107
U.S. at 720. It held that the mandamus against the Board would have the same effect, largely
because the money available to pay the bonds was state property commingled in the state
treasury. 107 U.S. at 722-27. The opinion concluded:
The remedy sought, in order to be complete, would require the court to assume all the
executive authority of the State, so far as it related to the enforcement of this law, and to
supervise the conduct of all persons charged with any official duty in respect to the levy,
collection, and disbursement of the tax in question until the bonds, principal and interest,
were paid in full, and that, too, in a proceeding in which the State, as a State, was not and
could not be made a party. . . . When a State submits itself, without reservation, to the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular case, that jurisdiction may be used to give full effect
to what the State has . . . allowed to be done; and if the law permits coercion of the public
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to protect the state's political discretion to tax or appropriate against
a federal judicial decision that the state's past conduct has created a
fixed monetary claim against it.219 Under the law as it stood before
the era of structural litigation, the "state," for eleventh amendment
purposes, was its treasury.
Therefore, one obvious reaction of state defendants to the fiscal
burdens imposed by structural decrees was to contend that the financial e.ffect of the action made the suit, despite its form under Young,
in substance one which the eleventh amendment had removed from
officers to enforce any judgment that may be rendered, then such coercion may be em•
ployed for that purpose. But this is very far from authorizing the courts, when a State
cannot be sued, to set up its jurisdiction over the officers in charge of the public moneys,
so as to control them as against the political power in their administration of the finances
of the State.
107 U.S. at 727-28. While Chief Justice Waite's opinion is a bit prolix, it states the issue
plainly enough. Justice Harlan's dissent, attempting to untangle the Chief Justice's thoughts,
assumes that the majority based its decision on the eleventh amendment and argues that the
amendment does not apply to a federal constitutional claim against a state officer. 107 U.S. at
7S2-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Jumelwas followed by Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. S2 (1886), a case presenting a less
direct assault on the state treasury. South Carolina's Reconstruction government had in
March 1872 made certain "revenue bond scrip" receivable in payment of taxes; in December
1873 the new regime ena1.1ed a statute forbidding any state officer to accept the scrip in pay•
ment of taxes. 117 U.S. at S4-S6. Bondholders who had unsuccessfully tendered scrip for taxes
brought suit for a declaratory judgment that the authorizing statute was a binding contract and
that the repealing statute violated the contract clause; they also requested "proper process" to
compel the comptroller-general to accept the scrip. The circuit court granted such a decree.
117 U.S. at S7-61. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decree was in essence one for
specific performance by the state of its contract to accept the scrip in payment of taxes and was
therefore barred by the eleventh amendment as applied in Jumel 117 U.S. at 67-68. It characterized the decree as an attempt to "enforce the judgment of the court against the State through
its officers, in a suit to which it is not a party." 117 U.S. at 71.
Jumelwas again followed in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), which also involved bond
coupons receivable for taxes. Here, however, the Supreme Court had previously held that
Virginia's repudiation violated the contract clause and that a state tax collector who refused to
accept coupons and then distrained on the bondholder for nonpayment of taxes was personally
liable for conversion. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 1l4 U.S. 270 (188S). The state responded
with a statute requiring its Attorney General to institute what amounted to unusually burdensome litigation against anyone who tendered coupons: the case would be heard in Richmond
and the defendant had the burden of proving the genuineness of the coupons. The harassing
effect of the litigation effectively destroyed the after-market for the coupons among Virginia
taxpayers, and out-of-state bondholders who had purchased the bonds for resale to Virginia
taxpayers obtained a temporary restraining order against enforcement. In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
at 446-SS. Attorney General Ayers was held in contempt for violating the temporary restraining order, but the Supreme Court reversed. Citing Hagood and Jumel, it concluded that
the restraining order was an attempt to compel Virginia to accept coupons on the terms provided when they were issued, and therefore a suit against the treasury for specific performance
forbidden by the eleventh amendment. 123 U.S. at 490-92, S02-04.
These three cases stand for the proposition that injunctive relief that requires "payment"
from the state treasury, either by way of direct disbursement of funds or by cancellation of
debts owing to the state, is within the proscription of the eleventh amendment and so beyond
the power of a federal court.
219. See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 49-Sl (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178
U.S. 436, 439-40 (1900); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883).
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the jurisdiction of the federal courts.220 In response, the Supreme
Court has taken two conflicting approaches. The first, in Edelman v.
Jordan, 221 Milliken v. Bradley,222 and Hutto v. Finney, 223 denies eleventh amendment immunity from decrees against state executive officers that impose prospective financial commitments on their
agencies. The second, in Alabama v. Pugfi224 and Quern v. Jordqn, 225
emphasizes the immunity of the state, as opposed to its officers, from
direct judicial relief. The power of the federal courts to fund structural decrees by direct proceedings against a state treasury turns
upon where the boundary is drawn between these two lines of
authority.
Edelman was a suit against Illinois officials administering a federally funded welfare program which had systematically failed to meet
the federal time limits for processing benefit claims, with the result
that eligible applicants never received benefits due them for the period between mandated and actual approval. The district court enjoined the defendants to comply with the federal regulations in the
future and to "release and remit . . . benefits wrongfully withheld"
in the past.226 The defendants asserted on appeal that the award of
past-due benefits was a judgment against the state in violation of the
eleventh amendment. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court, arguing that this provision of the order was equitable restitution permitted under Young.2 27
The Supreme Court reversed on this point, stating that regardless
of the equitable form of the relief, payment of the past-due benefits
was "in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an
award of damages against the State." 228 The opinion identifies four
such "aspects":
1. The payment is "compensation" for past violations of the law.
2. The defendants were, at the time of the violation, "under no courtimposed obligation" to conform to the correct legal standard.
220. E.g., Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 989-90 (7th Cir. 1971), revd sub nom. Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
221. 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
222. 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977).
223. 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978).
224. 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
225. 440 U.S. 332, 345 n.17 (1979).
226. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 656.
227. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1973), revd sub nom. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
228. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
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3. The award will be paid from state funds "to a virtual certainty"
and not by the defendant state officials individually;
4. The award is "measured in terms of monetary loss resulting from a
past breach of a legal duty" by the defendant state officials.229

Therefore, the opinion concludes, the order to pay past-due benefits
was not within the Young doctrine and was barred by the eleventh
amendment.
The opinion carefully distinguishes the retroactive award from
the financial consequences of the order to comply with federal law in
the future. It notes that in Goldberg v. Kelly 230 and Graham v. Richardson, 231 the Court had ordered procedural and substantive
. changes in state welfare administration under which "[s]tate officials,
in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the Court's
decrees, would more likely have to spend money from the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their previous conduct."232 The Edelman opinion justified this effect virtually without
explanation on the ground that the "ancillary effect on the state
treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the
principle announced in Young. " 233 It should be noted, however, that
the decrees in Goldberg and Graham, while controlling the eligibility
of individuals for benefits, did not direct the state to maintain any
specific aggregate level of benefits.234
The Court elaborated the distinction between retrospective and
prospective payments in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken IJ). 235 In Milliken I, the Supreme Court had limited the reach of the busing remedy to the City of Detroit and rejected the lower court's attempt to
extend the remedy beyond those school districts where constitutional
violations had been found. 236 On remand, the district court had ordered the Detroit school board to implement programs of reading
instruction, teacher training, testing and student counselling, both to
assist effective desegregation and to remedy the adverse effects of the
229. 415 U.S. at 668.
230. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
231. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
232. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
233. 415 U.S. at 668.
234. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg assumes that the benefit pool will remain constant.
397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
235. 433 U.S. 267 (1977), qffg. 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), qfg. 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
236. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (Milliken I), revg. 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973), modifying 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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former segregated system on pupils and teachers. 237 From the beginning of the litigation, the Governor of Michigan and the state's education officials were joined as defendants,238 and subsequently the
State of Michigan, through its officials, was found guilty of fostering
the segregation of Detroit's schools.239 The decree therefore ordered
the State to pay one half the costs of the court-ordered desegregation
plan. 240 Since this had largely been proposed by the Detroit Board
with plaintiffs acquiescence, Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Milliken II aptly characterized the decree as a combined attack by
the plaintiffs and the Detroit school board on the state's treasury. 241
The state defendants, among other objections, claimed that their
obligation to pay for the remedial progress was " 'in practical effect,
indistinguishable from an award of money damages against the state
based upon the asserted prior misconduct of state officials' " 242 and
therefore barred under the eleventh amendment as interpreted in
Edelman. 243 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the expenditures, despite their "direct and substantial" effect on the treasury, were to be applied prospectively to bring about the benefits of a
desegregated school system by curing the past effects of segregation.244 Even though the court-mandated programs would admittedly have a compensatory effect, the Court viewed this as
subordinate to the plan's prospective role in the continuing operation
of the school system.245 Moreover, unlike the invalid award in
Edelman, the state did not pay "an accrued monetary liability" to
individual citizens.246 Therefore, the opinion concludes, the funding
order fell within the prospective relief permitted under Young. 247
In Edelman and Milliken the Court indicated that the distinction
237. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1118-19, 1138-45 (E.D. Mich. 1975), qffd., 540
F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), qffd. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
238. The original defendants in the suit were the Board of Education of the City of Detroit,
its members and its former superintendent of schools, the Governor, the Attorney General, the
State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction of Michigan. On
an appeal of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals reversed that portion of the order which dismissed the Governor and Attorney General as defendants. Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1970).
239. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971), qffd., 484 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
240. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 246 (6th Cir. 1976), qffd., 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
241. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring).
242. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 289 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 34).
243. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 289 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 651).
244. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 289-90.
245. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 290.
246. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 290 n.22 (distinguishing Edelman v. Jordan).
247. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 288-91.
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between forbidden relief against the state and permissible relief
against state officials was not clear cut.248 The predominant factor
leading the Court to conclude that a certain type of relief is impermissible appears to be the payment of specific, ascertainable funds to
identifiable individuals; this is forbidden, at least in the absence of
violation of a prior court order. 249 In contrast, when the "compensatory" elements of permissible prospective relief run to a class whose
members are the unspecified future clients of the institution, relief is
permissible because class members are not necessarily the victims of
past wrongful conduct and will not be "compensated" except by participating in the class in the future. 250 In other words, individual
:financial relief, complete when paid, is analogous to damages; relief
in kind as a side effect of a properly functioning institution is not,
cost what it may. From the state's point of view the result appears
paradoxical: the eleventh amendment protects it from a perfected,
specific liability but leaves it open to potentially unlimited inchoate
:financial obligation. It should be noted, however, that both cases
involve primary decrees against executive branch defendants;
neither purports to direct the legislature to provide the funds or to
continue the operation and neither deals with a refusal of the legislature to do so.251 The opinions therefore do not consider the extent to
which :financial obligations of executive officers may be enforced
against the state treasury.
The Supreme Court did face this difficulty in Hutto v. Finney. 252
In one aspect of a continuing structural suit over the Arkansas prison
system, the district court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs as
compensation for the state defendants' litigation in bad faith, directing that the award be paid from the Department of Corrections
funds. 253 The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the state's eleventh amendment plea. 254 Stating that, under Edelman, the cost of
248. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 289-90; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-67.
249. See Milliken JI, 433 U.S. at 290 n.22; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69.
250. See Milliken JI, 433 U.S. at 290 & n.21. This type of compensation is the very essence
of structural relief. See 0. F1ss, supra note 12, at 10-11; Chayes, supra note 10, at 1298; Fiss,
supra note 10, at 21-22.
251. Edelman was brought against the incumbent state and county welfare officials. See
Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 987 (7th Cir. 1973), revd. sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974). The State of Michigan was not a party in Milliken, and the funding order ran
against the executive branch defendants. See Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 245-46 (6th
Cir. 1976), qffd., 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken JI); Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 215, 220
(6th Cir. 1973), revd., 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
252. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
253. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 285 (E.D. Ark. 1976), qffd., 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir.
1977), qffd., 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
254. Hullo, 437 U.S. at 689-92.
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compliance is "ancillary" to prospective relief, Justice Stevens' opinion includes in that cost any civil contempt fine required to coerce
defendants to comply. Payment of attorneys' fees in compensation
for defendants' bad faith delay fell within this broad class. The fact
that it provided direct pecuniary benefit to plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their counsel) was less important than the power of the court
to give effective prospective relief by enforcing its decree. 255 Though
the opinion in Hutto does not make note of the point, this may be
seen as the converse of the Edelman proviso that the state defendants
there "were under no court-imposed obligation" not to harm the
plaintiff class.256 On its face, Hutto would seem to exclude all coercive civil contempt fines from eleventh amendment immunity.257
It can be argued from this line of cases that the eleventh amendment would pose no obstacle to a civil contempt order directly compelling the state to make whatever payments were needed to fund
compliance with a structural injunction. Structural relief is, by definition, prospective: it benefits the present and future members of the
plaintiff class by changing the institution's behavior toward that class
as clients of the institution. This change may require a considerable
amount of money; for example, the Milliken decree ordered the State
of Michigan to pay almost six million dollars to fund the Detroit
school board's compliance. 258 What the chancellor may order, he
may enforce; equity has never taken a modest view of its coercive
power. The Court's language in Hutto is broad enough to include
any civil contempt fine that has a coercive purpose, despite any
"compensatory" side effects. When the object of the contempt fine is
to fund compliance by the institution, rather than to compensate individuals, it is plainly within Hutto. If the executive defendants are
unable to comply because of the state's refusal to appropriate funds,
effective coercion requires that the source of funds be brought before
the court and made to disgorge. 259 Therefore, the argument runs,
the authority to make the primary decree, under Ex parte Young,
255. 437 U.S. at 691 n.17.
256. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
257. At least two courts appear to have so understood it. See Fonin v. Commissioner, 692
F.2d 790, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp.
631,639 (E.D. Pa. 1981), qffd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984).
258. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring).
259. In several cases involving local government defaults on municipal bonds, the
Supreme Coun approved mandatory injunctions requiring the municipality to levy taxes to
pay the bonds. See notes 324-38 iefra and accompanying text; cf. Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (district coun may require the county supervisors to levy taxes to raise
funds for the nondiscriminatory operation of the county school system).
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includes the authority to prevent the state from rendering it nugatory
by refusing to fund it.
There is an argument to the contrary, however. The payment of
attorneys' fees is distinguishable from the direct funding of compliance. Attorneys' fees in structural litigation are collateral to compliance and may be expected to be less costly than the direct burdens of
the decree. Historically, awards of attorneys' fees, when granted at
all, were treated as similar to court costs. The eleventh amendment
does not provide immunity against taxing costs when the state is
otherwise properly a party,260 and there was substantial, though not
unanimous, pre-Hutto authority to the effect that attorneys' fees were
also not within the immunity.26t
More importantly, the form and substance of the order in Hutto
merely directed an official defendant to allocate funds already within
his control to the required payment.262 The court did not consider
joining the state's taxing and appropriating authority as a party to
circumvent executive branch defendants who lacked the resources to
obey completely. 263 Alabama v. Pugh,264 decided the same term as
Hutto, indicated that the Supreme Court might not take that additional step. The case originated in three structural suits involving
the Alabama prison system and culminated in a consolidated decree
affirmed after modification by the Fifth Circuit.265 During the litigation the State of Alabama was named defendant along with the Governor and other state executives.266 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the decree entered against the state
260. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695-96 nn.24-26 (1978); Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 73-77 (1927).
261. The conflicting cases are collected at Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.5
(6th Cir. 1976), and Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 283 (E.D. Ark. 1976), affd., 548 F.2d
740 (8th Cir. 1977), affd., 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See also Note, Allorneys' Fees and the E!event/1
Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1875, 1888-96 (1975). The issue has been resolved against state
immunity by Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92, 697-98 (1978).
262. See Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 285 (E.D. Ark. 1976), affd., 548 F.2d 740 (8th
Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); accord Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
533 F. Supp. 631,637 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 613 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1315 (1984).
263. But cf. Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1977) (district court state disbursing officers not to enforce state law that would prevent them from drawing unappropriated
funds from treasury); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631, 640
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (state treasurer to be joined if executive defendants do not pay $10,000 per day
civil contempt fine), affd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984).
264. 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
265. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd and mod!fied sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, revd in part by
companion case, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
266. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782 (1978).
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violated the eleventh amendment, and, in a terse per curiam opinion,
held that it did. 267 The Court held that the State of Alabama could
not be sued in its own name without its consent, which was concededly absent. 268 In response to Justice Stevens' dissent, 269 the Court
argued that its decision was "not merely academic," because "Alabama has an interest in being dismissed from this action in order to
eliminate the danger of being held in contempt if it should fail to
comply with the mandatory injunction." 270
This short, cryptic statement must mean something, and precisely
what it means may be crucial to enforcing a structural injunction.
The Hutto opinion, in sweeping language, had just said that the eleventh amendment posed no obstacle to civil contempt proceedings
against the executive branch defendants in a Youngsuit. 271 The Alabama litigation had placed all relevant executive officers, from the
Governor on down, within the decree and therefore subject to the
civil contempt power. One doubts that the Supreme Court would
take the trouble to correct a mere technical error of form in a complex decree. Therefore, although it did not articulate it, the Court in
Pugh apparently believed that contempt proceedings against the
state itself would infringe the interest protected by the eleventh
amendment in a way that contempt proceedings against the executive branch defendants would _not. Given the very broad power to
reallocate funds and displace management which the courts could
exert over the executive branch defendants, the only additional relief
that joining the state could bring is an obligation to provide the necessary funds. 272
267. 438 U.S. at 782.
268. 438 U.S. at 782.
269. 438 U.S. at 782, 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. 438 U.S. at 782 (footnote omitted).
271. See text at notes 255-57 supra.
272. Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit has taken the position that where a state has
either waived eleventh amendment immunity, see Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150,
158-59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977), or has been sued by the United States and is
thus not protected by the eleventh amendment, see Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 475 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982), compliance with a
structural decree is not impossible as long as there are unappropriated funds in a solvent state
treasury. See J)efaware Valley, 678 F.2d at 475-76. But cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct 900 (1984) (when United States sues a state, the state's eleventh amendment immunity is unaffected as to state law claims of third parties). Add to this Justice Stevens' remark in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699 (1978) that a Young action is "for all
practical purposes, brought against the State;" accordVecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d at
156, and the route to the treasury is clear. See also Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744 (9th
Cir. 1982) (court quotes Justice Stevens' language approvingly); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d
1268, 1271 (5th Cir.) (federal district court has authority to order that attorneys' fees be paid
out of state treasury), rehg. granted, 636 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1980); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 545
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If it ever considers the question, I believe the Court will conclude
that an inescapable obligation of the taxing and appropriating authority to provide funds is the infringement avoided by Pugh. A majority of the court has intimated as much in two subsequent
decisions. Quern v. Jordan, 213 which reiterates the "prospective/retrospective" distinction of Edelman, holds that an injunction
requiring state authorities to notify welfare claimants that they can
apply to the state for wrongly withheld benefits is not "retroactive."
The critical distinction, according to Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion, is that the payment of retroactive benefits will depend on
the assent of the state authorities, including the appropriation of
funds by the legislature. 274 The majority opinion in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman215 discussed in dictum the proper
remedy for the state's failure to comply with federal statutory conditions for the receipt of federal funds. The Court noted that it had, in
some cases, enjoined enforcement of state law that conflicted with
federal standards and, in others, given a state the choice of complying or losing federal funds: 276 "In no case, however, have we required
a state to _provide money to _plaint!lft, much less required a State to
take on such open-ended and potentially burdensome obligations"
as the structural relief in this case. 277 These two opinions thrust toward the conclusion that a state must be left the option to stop proF. Supp. 36, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (court enforces award of attorneys' fees against the state); text
at notes 195-200 supra.
273. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
274. 440 U.S. at 347-48 & n.20.
275. 451 U.S. I (1981).
276. 451 U.S. at 29. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
211. Pennhursl, 451 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added).
The rights asserted by the Pennhursl plaintiffs arose from the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 and Supp. III 1979), a grant-in-aid
statute enacted under the spending power. The Court held that Congress had not intended to
create by that statute an enforceable private right to treatment. 45 I U.S. at 15-27. Justice
White's dissent disagreed on congressional intent, 451 U.S. at 36-47 (White, J., dissenting), but
agreed that when the statute conditioned receipt by the state of federal funds on meeting its
standards, the appropriate remedy was to give the state a choice between meeting the conditions and losing the funds. 451 U.S. at 53-55. He specifically disapproved the use of an unconditional decree to enforce the statute. 451 U.S. at 53-55. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
the dissent.
On remand, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the decree on the basis of state statutory obligations to the retarded. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.
1982), revd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). The Supreme Court vacated this decision on the ground
that the eleventh amendment precluded federal injunctive relief against state officers for violation of state law. The Court remanded for consideration of relief based on any remaining
federal grounds, but warned that any structural relief imposing prospective financial obligations must be "constrained by principles of comity and federalism," 104 S. Ct. at 910 n.13, In
the same footnote it explicitly declined to discuss the eleventh amendment constraints on such
an injunction. On the whole, the future of the Pennhursl decree appears extremely bleak.

August 1984]

Financing Structural Injunctions

1865

viding a program if it chooses not to meet federal legal requirements
for engaging in the activity.
This approach would provide an escape from the apparent paradox of Edelman that seems to protect the state against definite, matured financial burdens while exposing it to continuing, indefinite
costs. If the state is allowed to end its involvement, its prospective
obligations cease because there are no more members of the class of
clients of the institution. While the federal decree may place a higher
price on the decision whether to tax or appropriate, ie., voluntary or
compelled shutdown, the decision would remain within the legislature's hands. The impact on the state's treasury of the structural decree becomes avoidable because it is prospective.
Nor would this view of eleventh amendment immunity make the
structural decree futile. 278 The right of the plaintiff clients or, conversely, the obligation of the state is not that services be rendered but
that, if rendered, they meet federal constitutional standards. Rather
than meet them, the state may choose not to provide the service.279
278. The argument that it would do so derives from Justice Stevens' statements in Hutto v.
Finney:
The line between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid that it defeats the
effective enforcement of prospective relief . . . . Many of the court's most effective enforcement weapons involve financial penalties . . . . If a state agency refuses to adhere to
a court order, a financial penalty may be the most effective means of insuring compliance.
The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not
require federal courts to enforce their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail.
437 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1978). See also Fortin v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 790, 797-98 (1st Cir.
1982). This argument, however, begs the question of what the state agency's duties may be
under the substantive law.
279. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the Supreme Court permitted the City
of Jackson, Mississippi to close its municipal swimming pools rather than obey a court order to
desegregate them. Justice Black's majority opinion noted that there was no "affirmative duty"
for the state to provide the facilities and that the closing equally deprived black and white
residents of public recreational facilities. 403 U.S. at 225-26. Accord Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435, 445-46 (1970).
These two cases may be distinguished from Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964), the one Supreme Court decision compelling a local government to reopen closed facilities. In Griffin, the county, acting pursuant to a state statute, had resisted a desegregation
decree by closing its public schools and paying state and local school funds as tuition grants
and property tax credits for white children attending segregated private schools. 377 U.S. at
222-24. The Supreme Court directed the district court to enjoin the tuition-grant system and
co=and the county to reopen a desegregated public school system. 377 U.S. at 232-34. Justice Black's opinion for the Court further stated that, if necessary, the district court could order
the county to levy and collect sufficient taxes to finance the system. 377 U.S. at 233. In
Palmer, Justice Black distinguished Griffin as having involved not a true shutdown but the
disguised continuance of the segregated school system, 403 U.S. at 221-22; accord Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. at 445. Moreover, he noted, Virginia state law required every other county to
provide some form of public education. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. at 221; Griffin v.
County School Bd, 377 U.S. at 229-32.
For a critical assessment of Palmer, emphasizing the city's invidious racial motives and the
stigmatizing effect of the closing, see L. TRIBE, supra note 212, §§ 16-17, at 1027-28. See also
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. at 266-71 (White, J., dissenting).
Griffin has, to the extent of this writer's knowledge, never been applied as authority for an
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Beyond the duties not to discriminate on the basis of suspect classification280 and not to confine more stringently than warranted, 281 the
present Supreme Court has declined to impose on the states a substantive constitutional duty to tax and spend for the benefit of those
in apparent need. 282 Moreover, to protect the states' ability to make
informed fiscal choices, the Court has declared that Congress will be
presumed not to have imposed substantive obligations on the states
simply by providing federal funds unless it clearly states the conditions for receiving them. 283 Underlying the absence of positive state
obligation is the policy of preserving the state's political control over
the transfer of wealth through taxation and the allocation of public
funds. 284
affirmative duty to provide services in the absence of discriminatory provision to other members of the public. The option not to provide services is even more clear when the substantive
right at issue derives not from the Constitution or substantive federal statute, but from the
state's acceptance of federal funds subject to conditions. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp,
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 53-55 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); 451 U.S. at 29-30 (majority
opinion).
280. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
281. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
282. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70
(1977); Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489-91 (1977); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-40 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 549-51 (1972).
283. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There
can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a state is unaware of the conditions or is
unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insistin$ that
Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the states to exercise their choice knowmgly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 17 (1981) (citations omitted),
The state option not to participate may, for some programs, be a real one. In Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 420 (1977), the majority opinion pointed out that only about one-half
the states had chosen to participate in the federally-funded Aid to Families with Dependent
Children - Unemployed Father (AFDC • UF) program. The Court took this lack of participation into account in construing the federal regulations in a manner attractive to the states.
432 U.S. at 432.
284. Justice Powell, in particular, has expounded the position that a constitutional duty to
subsidize or facilitate the exercise of liberties with public funds would result in unacceptable
judicial control of basic taxing decisions. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-77 (1977); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37, 40-44 (1973). The same conclusion has been reached by a different analysis through the proposition that there is no "property" interest in the continued existence of the legislation that establishes an entitlement. See
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 798-99 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 538-40
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984).
The Supreme Court's decisions on equal protection in the allocation of welfare benefits and
due process in benefit determinations have been pervaded by the assumption that the pool of
available money is beyond the judiciary's power to enlarge and that gains by one class of
recipients will therefore result in losses to others. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs.
v. Horody, 431 U.S. 471, 490-91 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,348 (1976); Dan•
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If this limited view of the substantive rights and duties involved
in structural decrees continues, it is likely that the Supreme Court
will preserve the separation between the state as an entity and its
executive officers, postulated in Young, and refuse to permit the contempt power to be exerted against a state treasury to increase the
total funds available to comply with the decree. 285 If, on the contrary, the view ultimately prevails that the Constitution establishes
substantive rights to dignity and equality that can only be satisfied
by the transfer of wealth by government action,286 the Court will
have to recognize that the state is the "real party in interest,"287 discard the fiction of Young, and accept the judicial control of the public fisc as a means to implement these rights. 288 Unless and until the
Supreme Court reaches that point, it can and probably will use eleventh amendment immunity to preserve the ultimate political control
of the decision to tax and spend.
There are nevertheless four classes of cases in which the state
treasury may be directly attacked because eleventh amendment immunity is unavailable. First, the eleventh amendment does not apply to suits by the United States against a state.289
Second, Congress may divest the states of eleventh amendment
immunity, without their consent, by statute enacted under the endridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting).
285. From this perspective, both an order directed against the disbursing authorities and
an order directing the legislature to appropriate would be in substance against the state, a party
distinct from the executive defendants. See Hagood v. Southern, 115 U.S. 52 (1886); Louisiana
v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 71 I, 727-28 (1882).
286. See Clune, Tlze Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth ,Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1915 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 289, 327-43; Karst, Tlze Supreme Court, 1976 Term Foreword· Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 5-8, 59-64
(1977); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional We!fare Rights: One View ofRawls' Theory of
Justice, 121 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 962, 997-1019 (1973); Michelman, Tlze Supreme Court, 1968 Term Foreword· On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 933 (1969); cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 212, § 16-57, at 1135.
Professor Tribe has also proposed that existing statutory entitlement programs which transfer wealth to those who become dependent on them should be regarded as vested rights for the
purpose of the contract clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 1, or the just compensation clause,
U.S. CONST. amend. V, in order to protect the recipients' expectations of continued support.
L. TRIBE, supra note 212, § 9-2, at 459 & n.11, § 9-7, at 471 & n.8; cf. id at§ 10-10, at 525-26
(limits on due process protection for "entitlement" programs).
287. Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 1980); accordHutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 699 (1978).
288. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 357-66 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment); Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 680-84 (1974) (Pouglas, J., dissenting); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-39 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
289. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-30 (1934), and cases cited
therein.
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forcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. 290 The Supreme
Court has held that Congress did so with respect to back pay liability
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act291 and with respect to
attorneys' fees in civil rights actions. 292 The Court's position, however, is that such a divestiture requires either explicit statutory language or clear legislative intent. These it has not been eager to
:fi.nd.293 In particular, the Court has concluded that the 1871 enactment of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, under which structural litigation is
often brought, did not abrogate the states' eleventh amendment
•
·ty•294
lillfilUill

Third, the eleventh amendment does not bar the award of court
costs against a state. 295 While the lower federal courts were divided
on the issue before 1979, a substantial number had concluded that
the states were not immune from attorneys' fees taxed along with
costs, particularly when imposed as a penalty for litigation in bad
290. It should be noted in passing that any restriction on Congress' legislative powers in
the tenth amendment does not apply to remedial legislation enacted under its power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. Love v. Waukesha Joint School Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 560 F.2d
285, 287 (7th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (C.D,
Cal. 1981), qjfd, 106 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984); Guardians
Assn. of the New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Serv. Commn. of New York, 630.F.2d 79, 88
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); see also Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433
U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (tenth amendment does not bar a federal court judgment enforcing the
fourteenth amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56 (1976) (fourteenth amendment effects an alteration in the state-federal relationship and congressional power under § 5 is
not limited by aspects of state sovereignty); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, Virginia, 462
F.2d 1058, 1068-69 (4th Cir. 1972) (when the tenth amendment conflicts with the fourteenth,
the latter prevails), qjfd by eljllally divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (19.74). See generally National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Whether those restrictions would apply to the
creation of private rights under the spending power is more problematic. See National League
of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17; L. TRIBE, supra note 212, § 5-22, at 315-16.
291. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-57 (1976); see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, §§ 70l(a), (f), as amended al 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S,C.
§§ 2000e(a), (f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
292. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-98 (1978); see42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp, IV
1980).
293. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity JJoctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the Stales, 126 U.
PA, L. REv. 1203, 1240-52 (1978); Note, Civil Rights Suits Against Stale and Local Governmental Entities and Oj/icia/s: Rights ofAction, Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL, L. REV, 945,
1068-87 (1980).
294. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979). Since the relief at issue in Quern was
prospective and thus not subject to the eleventh amendment at all, Justice Brennan's concurrence in the judgment correctly states that the Court's discussion of this point was dictum. 440
U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 290-91
n. 23 (1977) (explicitly reserving the question of whether the fourteenth amendment, by itself,
works a partial repeal of the eleventh amendment). Quern nevertheless appears to be a deliberate statement of the current majority's view of the subject.
295. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 696 n.26 (1978); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
275 U.S. 70 (1927).
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faith. 296 Other ancillary expenses in structural litigation, such as the
compensation and expenses of masters and receivers, fall within the
traditional sphere of taxable costs,297 and the logic of Hutto appears
to allow them. One lower federal court has accordingly rejected
eleventh amendment defenses to their payment. 2 98
Finally, a state may waive its eleventh amendment immunity in
particular cases by consenting to the jurisdiction of the federal
court.299 However, a state's counsel may appear and defend an action on the merits that would fall within the eleventh amendment
without automatically waiving immunity. State executive officers
may waive immunity only when authorized by state law, which is to
be construed narrowly against that authority.300 Where a state constitutional or statutory provision retains immunity, general statutory
power to appear and defend or compromise litigation does not authorize state counsel to waive immunity by entering a consent decree
or proceeding on the merits.301 Moreover, since eleventh amendment immunity is akin to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it may
be first raised by the state at any point in the litigation, at least until
a decision is final for res judicata purposes.302 While the point ulti296. See note 261 supra and accompanying text.
297. See Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 743-46 (6th Cir. 1979); Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, revd in part by companion case, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Hart v. Booklyn Community School Bd., 383
F. Supp. 699, 767 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), qffd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
298. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631,639 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
qffd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. l3l5 (1984).
If this case is correct, it appears that the eleventh amendment would not have barred relief
against the state in New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (2d
Cir. 1980), if the consent decree had obliged the state to fund the monitoring panel. See also
notes 126-28 supra and accompanying text.
299. This waiver must be distinguished from a constructive waiver in a class of cases by
participating in a federally regulated activity. See generally Field, supra note 293, at 1209-18.
300. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v.
Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Richins v. Industrial
Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 1974).
301. Compare Gallagher v. Continental Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1974) (appearance by Colorado Attorney General with general authority to represent state is waiver)
with Richins v. Industrial Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 1974) (appearance by
Utah Attorney General is not waiver when Utah has retained eleventh amendment immunity
by statute); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 1974) (consent decree for payment of
attorneys' fees entered into by Ohio Attorney General who was not authorized to enter into
such a decree does not waive eleventh amendment immunity), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975),
with Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1974) (consent decree settling a claim is a
waiver of any eleventh amendment defense as to that claim).
302. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974). On effect of resjudicata, compare Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150, 159 & n.7 (3d Cir.) (waiver precludes claim of
immunity on collateral attack), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977), with Jordon v. Gilligan, 500
F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974) (dictum saying the state may raise the issue of immunity at any
time since it goes to subject matter jurisdiction), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
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mately turns on the federal court's construction of state law,303 reasonably explicit state language should preclude unauthorized
executive branch waiver in contested litigation. Asserting that a
waiver was unauthorized with respect to a consent decree is a more
difficult procedural problem because the legislature may not become
aware of the executive's action until after the time for appeal has
long passed. However, the state's claim to vacate the decree for lack
of jurisdiction may be raised "within a reasonable time" on a motion
under the Federal Rules. 304
C.

Beyond Immunity: an Illustration

There are thus five current situations in which a federal court will
be able to exert its contempt power directly against the governmental
source of funds without eleventh amendment restriction: when the
United States obtains relief, 305 when Congress has specifically exempted the activity from eleventh amendment immunity,306 when
collateral expenses are involved,307 when the state has waived its immunity,308 and when the government in question is not a state or
state agency but a local government.309 The last is probably the most
significant. Since Monell v. .Department of Social Services of the City
ofNew York, 310 it has been possible to sue a local government in its
303. In Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150, 156-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
943 (1977), for example, Judge Gibbons inferred from the Attorney General's general statutory
power to conduct and settle litigation, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 292(b) (Purdon 1962) (repealed
1980), that Assistant Attorneys General had authority to waive eleventh amendment immunity
by consent decree. AccordDelaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470,
475 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982). At that time, there was no legislative provision
of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania; it was a common law doctrine developed under a
permissive constitutional provision. See Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa.
384, 402-04, 388 A.2d 709, 718-19 (1978); see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
Since that time, Pennsylvania has expressly asserted eleventh amendment immunity by
statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8521 (Purdon Supp. 1982). It has also denied any of its
counsel authority to enter any consent decree without the approval of the Governor and notice
to the Legislature. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-204(e) (Purdon Supp. 1982). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has disapproved Judge Gibbons' reading of the Pennsylvania law with respect
to a case begun before the enactment of these statutes. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 909 n.12 (1984).
304. FEo. R. C1v. P. 60(b); see note 302 supra and accompanying text; Jordon v. Gilligan,
500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974) (Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate based on voidness may be
raised at any time), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); hut see Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558
F.2d 150, 159 (3d Cir.) (because of waiver, final judgment is not void and Rule 60(b)(4) relief is
inappropriate), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
305. See note 289 supra and accompanying text.
306. See notes 290-94 supra and accompanying text.
307. See notes 295-96 supra and accompanying text.
308. See notes 299-304 supra and accompanying text.
309. See notes 201-03 supra and accompanying text.
310. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

August 1984)

Financing Structural Injunctions

1871

own name under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 over policies that deny constitutional rights. As the operators of school systems, jails, and the
like, local governments will frequently be the defendants in structural cases, and they are, as a class, outside the eleventh
amendment.311
Where there is no obstruction from eleventh amendment immunity, it is possible to dispense with the Young fiction that the officer
or his agency are acting distinctly from the government and to proceed against the body politic itself. A plaintiff who could do so
would be unwise not to. When seeking an injunction, it is always the
better practice to make the highest possible level of authority a defendant in order to bind clearly the broadest number of subordinates
by the decree. 312 A decree against a corporation runs against all its
employees in their official capacity,313 and, by the same principle, a
decree against a government as such binds all its officers. 314
Once a government is subj~ct to the court's powers, the next
question the court must address is whether these powers should be
exercised differently from those against a private corporate body.
The arguments for and against self-restraint in the exercise of the
federal courts' equity powers in structural cases are well known, and
I do not propose to restate them here. 315 As Professors Eisenberg
and Yeazell316 and Professor Chayes317 have said, they are inextrica311. The consequences of their exclusion appear clearly in Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp.
468, 478-79 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), qffd, 712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1907
(1984), in which the district court ordered the taxing and appropriating authorities of Buffalo,
N.Y., parties to the case from the outset, to appropriate an additional $7.4 million needed to
comply with the desegregation decree. The court reviewed in some detail the city's budget
practices and priorities as they related to the decree. 547 F. Supp. at 478-82.
312. See Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Ohligors to Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REV. 873, 89697 (1975).
This avoids the difficulties of the plaintiffs in Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474, 477-78
(4th Cir. 1963), who had brought suit against the Mayor of Lynchburg to desegregate the city
armory, only to find that the members of the city council would not be bound by a decree
because they were not acting in collusion with the Mayor or as his "agents, servants [or] employees" under FED. R. C1v. P. 65(d). Whether or not the court's reading of"the rule was
correct, the whole imbroglio could now be prevented by suing the municipality directly and as
a whole under Monell That course was not available in 1963. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 187, 191 (1961).
313. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376-77 (1911); In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548,
554-56 (1897); Le Trouneau Co. v. N.L.R.B., 150 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1945).
314. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn.,
443 U.S. 658, 692 n.32, 695-96 (1979); Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624, 627 (1879); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470,478 & n.17 (3d <:;ir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 969 (1982).
315. The arguments for judicial restraint are treated in detail in Fiss, supra note 10, at 2844, and summarized in Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 58, at 472-73. See also D. HOROWITZ,
supra note 2, at 255-74, 293-99.
·
316. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 58, at 510-16.
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bly entangled with one's views on the substantive rights implemented through structural litigation, a matter beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, I am going to present, as an example of what
can be done by a court indifferent to comity, 318 an historical episode
in which the Supreme Court sanctioned the broadest sort of intrusion into local government autonomy on behalf of substantive claims
that it took very seriously.
In the decade before the Civil War, towns and counties throughout the Midwest had been persuaded to finance railroad construction
by issuing municipal bonds to purchase stock in the railroad.
Though popular with voters at the time, these bond issues became
less so when the railroads, through the bad economic judgment, incompetence or the plain fraud and knavery of their promoters, did
not get built. In the eyes of the voters, no railroad meant no obligation to pay the bonds, and the localities defaulted. In suits by creditors, state courts frequently held that the bonds had been unlawfully
issued and were void. Where the bonds were held valid, municipalities obtained the repeal of their statutory authority to tax in order to
pay them. 319 In a series of decisions between 1864 and the 1880's,
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the bonds by making its
own interpretation of state law,320 and it held the repeals of taxing
statutes to be impairments of the obligation of contracts in violation
of article I, section 10, of the Constitution.321 These decisions were
vehemently opposed in the indebted communities, and there was
317. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1314-16.
318. The current majority of the Supreme Court is hardly indifferent. It has expressed
extreme disquiet, to say the least, at the detailed reordering of state and local government
functions unless intentional racial discrimination or systematic cruelty to prisoners is involved.
Compare Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (refusing to restrict policemen's use of
chokeholds on suspects), andR.izzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (reversing the district court's
order that city officials draft a comprehensive program for dealing with civilian complaints
against the police department), with Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (affirming district
court's detailed remedial orders to correct systematic abuses in the state prison system) and
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (affirming district court's broad decreealbeit narrower than an earlier plan-to remedy de }tire school segregation).
319. The background and the cases are described in great detail by Professor Fairman. 6
C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION 1864-88, Pt. I, 918-1116 (1971). The Court's substantive doctrine is analyzed in
Powe, Rehearsalfar Substantive .Due Process: The Municipal Bond Cases, 53 TEX. L. REV. 738,
738-48 (1975).
320. See Township at Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666 (1874); Olcott v. Supervisors of Fond du Lac, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1873); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I
Wall.) 175 (1864). See generally Powe, supra note 319, at 741-45.
321. See Butz v. City of Muscatine, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 575 (1869); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867). See generally 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 319, at 979,
1000-01.
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widespread resistance to paying the judgments.322 The response of
the lower federal courts323 and the Supreme Court324 was a line of
decisions holding that the taxing officers of the local governments
could be ordered, by process enforceable through criminal contempt, 325 to assess and collect the taxes required to pay judgments on
the defaulted bonds.
In one case, Supervisors of Lee County v. Rogers,326 the Supreme
Court went further. The supervisors of Lee County, Iowa, had refused to comply with a mandamus to collect taxes to meet a judgment, and the Court held that the federal circuit court had authority
to appoint the U.S. Marshal as receiver to collect them. 327 At that
time, a federal court's authority to issue process was governed by a
statute328 which gave a federal court the same authority as a court of
the state where it sat would have. An Iowa statute provided that if a
mandamus was disobeyed the court could direct that the action required of the defendant be done by a court-appointed third party at
defendant's expense.329 Since the mandamus had been disobeyed,
the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court should direct its
marshal to collect the taxes. 330 However, Lee County was a high
water mark. In subsequent cases, the Court consistently refused to
find that it had a general equity power, in the absence of such a state
statute, to give plaintiffs an adequate remedy by appointing a receiver to collect taxes. 331 It noted, however, that an order enforceable by contempt proceedings against the responsible local officials
was the appropriate relief. 332 The result was usually that the munici322. See 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 319, at 947-51, 959-66, 980-89, 1038-43. Resistance
reached the point that President Grant felt compelled to warn that he would support collection
of the judgments with troops. Id. at 984-85.
323. See Durant v. Supervisors of Washington County, 8 F. Cas. 128 (C.C.D. Iowa 1869)
(No. 4191); United States ex rel Thompson v. Lee County, 26 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1869)
(No. 15,589).
324. Supervisors of Washington County v. Durant, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 415 (1870); Riggs v.
Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1868).
325. See Durant v. Supervisors of Washington County, 8 F. Cas. 128, 129 (C.C.D. Iowa
1869) (No. 4191).
326. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 175 (1869).
327. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 180-81.
328. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § I, 4 Stat. 278 (1846).
329. See Lee County, 74 U.S. at 177; cf. lowA CODE ANN. § 661.15 (West Supp. 1984)
(current version of this provision). Professor Fairman finds no cases applying the statute except Lee County. 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 319, at 965 n.162, 1039.
330. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 177.
331. The leading case is Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107 (1874). Cases
following Rees include Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S. 550 (1885), and Barkley v. Levee
Commissioners, 93 U.S. 258 (1876).
332. See Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624 (1879).

1874

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1815

palities settled with their creditors for what they could get.333
If these cases were applied in the modem context, at the very
least, they would stand for the proposition that the members of the
taxing and appropriating body of a government properly before the
court334 could be ordered to raise the funds needed to comply with a
structural decree and held personally responsible if they did not. 335
This power would extend, a fortiori, to the less intrusive device of
ordering a disbursing officer to release funds already on hand. 33 6
Moreover, the type of direct relief provided in Lee County no longer
depends on state law governing available remedies. The powers of a
federal district court to enforce its judgments are controlled by the
-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 70 provides for substituted
performance by a court-created replacement for the defendant in
terms substantially identical to the Iowa statute involved in Lee
County. 337 Such an intervention into the locai taxing power would
be far beyond anything that the district courts have attempted in
modem times, 338 but the mechanism can be derived from prior exer333. See 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 319, at 983-84, 986, 1094-95. Bui cf. id at 1038-40,
1043-47 (two instances of municipalities evading the courts with the result that settlement was
never reached or was substantially delayed). Litigation in this area ultimately died out with
the development of the modem system of pre-issue approval by bond counsel and credit rating
services. See id at 920-23, 1101.
334. "Properly" is here used in the sense of having no eleventh amendment immunity.
335. Such an order to appropriate was issued in Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468
(W.D.N.Y. 1982), '!/fd, 712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1907 (1984), but the
question of sanctions did not arise in that case.
It should be noted that the absolute immunity of state legislators from suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is limited to damages. See Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391 (1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272
(4th Cir. 1980). Immunity does not extend to injunctive relief. See Kucinich v. Forbes, 432 F.
Supp. 1101, 1108 n.8 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has recently held that neither the speech
and debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. I, the tenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X,
nor general principles of federalism preclude the conviction of a state legislator for a federal
crime based on his legislative acts and statements. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360
(1980). Gillock reiterates the immunity provided in Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, against private
damage claims, but it is unclear whether it would permit civil contempt proceedings in an
action properly brought against legislators. 445 U.S. at 371-73, quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at
372, 376; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-92 (1978) (discussed at notes 252-63 supra and
accompanying text). Since criminal contempt proceedings are a federal criminal prosecution
under a statute, however, they would apparently be permissible under Gillock. 445 U.S. at
372-73; see 18 U.S.C. § 401; note 83 supra.
336. It should also be noted that when the local government is properly sued in its own
name, its disbursing officer would be bound, in his official capacity, by any decree against it.
See note 314 supra and accompanying text.
331. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
338. The most pronounced intrusion into local fiscal management known to this writer is
Judge Battisti's attempt to compel the Cleveland school authorities to default on short-term
debt, despite a state court judgment to the contrary, in order to free funds for current operations of the Cleveland schools, which were under a desegregation order. See National City
Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977).
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cises of the traditional equity power of the federal courts.
CONCLUSION

The parallel drawn in the preceding section is obviously not exact. The municipal bond cases involved a public authority's contractual duties to repay specific sums, an interest on the part of the
bondholders which the Supreme Court had no difficulty in treating
as akin to a vested right. 339 Modem structural litigation, on the other
hand, involves statutorily-based payments, in cash or in kind, on
which the recipients to some degree are dependent. Under current
Supreme Court doctrine, there is apparently no constitutional duty
to begin such payments and the right to receive them is not "vested"
against a subsequent legislative decision not to tax or spend for that
purpose.340 When faced with a state or local government that does
not provide the money needed to operate an institution at federal
standards, one might argue that respect for democratic control of
taxing and spending decisions therefore requires the federal court to
respond to the refusal by closing the institution rather than bypassing the defendants' taxing and appropriating system to :finance it.
Shutdown, however unwelcome to plaintiffs, is not an inadequate
remedy if their substantive right is only to have the institution meet
constitutional or federal statutory standards so long as it operates at
all. The respective opinions in Pennhurst show that a majority of the
Court appears to agree, at least when the federal standards derive
only from the spending power.341
The Court's approach, however, is in my view too quick to :find
an irrevocable political decision not to provide adequate funds.
Without going so far as to give dependent plaintiffs a vested right to
receive continued benefits, a district court should be able to presume,
first, that the program's existence shows that, at some point, the
political authorities had decided that the public interest required
them to provide the services in question and, second, that that assessment of the public interest remains valid until the political authorities clearly state that they would rather see the plaintiff class have
nothing than meet the cost of federal standards. A clear statement in
this context means the explicit abolition of the activity involved: it
does not mean the normal temporizing of elected bodies in the hope
339. See Powe, supra note 319, at 741-47, 753-54.
340. See notes 280-84 supra and accompanying text.
341. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 29 (1981), and at 5355 (White, J., dissenting).
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that the difficult choice will not have to be made.342 In particular, it
does not mean an attempt to continue the activity while not appropriating adequate funds to meet federal standards, for by doing that
the appropriating body has merely indicated that it is unwilling to
make the required choice between shutdown and compliance with
the decree. If the political authorities want to continue the activity at
all, the full resources of equity ought to be available to assure that it
is only continued in compliance with the decree's obligations.
This approach is clearly biased toward continuing the institutional services on which plaintiff classes depend. It assumes that in
most cases the political authorities, if compelled to decide, will find
the money rather than terminate the institution. In those cases
where shutdown is out of the question, such as prisons, it will prevent them from passively obstructing compliance with the decree. In
the case of so-called benevolent activities, where shutdown is politically conceivable, it would place the onus of the decision squarely
where it belongs - on the elected authorities and ultimately on the
voters, who must decide how much of the community's wealth will
be transferred by taxation. If the political will, when faced with a
clear choice, would rather abolish a program than pay to provide it
at constitutional standards, current Supreme Court doctrine appears
to require that the choice be honored by the federal courts.343 The
courts need hardly rush to conclude, however, that the political will
has made that difficult and unpleasant choice; much less should they
take the choice upon themselves. 344
"Principle aside," Judge Weinstein has said, "we recognize that
even the once-powerful King of England had to bow to Parliament's
fund-raising powers; no judge will ignore the central reality that it is
the legislature and the public, not the courts, which raise funds and
342. In affirming the district court's order to close the Charles Street Jail after the Boston
City Council had refused for five years to build the required replacement, the First Circuit
characterized the Council's most recent activity as "an ostrich-like wish that the necessity to
settle on a site and make available adequate funds would disappear." Inmates of the Suffolk
County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 100 (1st Cir. 1978). Requiring a clear statement that the
legislature wants to terminate an activity is consistent with the doctrine that substantive statutes should not be repealed by implication, particularly implication based on appropriations
measures. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978).
343. See notes 175-80 supra and accompanying text.
344. In other contexts, Justice Rehnquist, for one, has strongly favored structuring principles of decision to prevent political authorities from foisting difficult political choices on nonelected decision makers. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 671-76, 685-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). That he would agree to this application of the principle is doubtful.
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decide how they are to be spent."345 As long as the Supreme Court
continues to decide that neither the fourteenth amendment nor legislation under the spending clause create absolute rights to a minimum
level of government services, the trucing and appropriating authorities will have the last word on whether their institutions will meet
minimum legal standards or cease to operate altogether. Until that
last word is spoken, however, the federal courts have substantial
power to insure that resources are available to comply with their decrees to maintain the constitutional minimum for such operation.
Within the defendant institution itself, reprogramming and displacement of management answer repeated claims of financial impossibility by directing the most efficient use of available funds and staff.
Where the political authorities depend on federal funds to carry on
activities they consider important, withholding the outside contribution should make them reconsider the advantages of cooperating
with the court. In the absence of eleventh amendment immunity, the
court may proceed directly against those in charge of the treasury
and the trucing decision. These powers long antedate the rise of
structural litigation. Whether their actual or threatened use against
public officials will be found appropriate depends, in the last analysis, on how committed the courts are to the substantive rights that
can only be implemented through the structural decree.

345. Weinstein, The Effect ofAusterity on Institutional Litigation, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
145, 146 (1982).

